What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? by Bartik, Timothy J.
Upjohn Institute Technical Reports Upjohn Research home page 
5-8-2018 
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
Timothy J. Bartik 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, bartik@upjohn.org 
Upjohn Author(s) ORCID Identifier: 
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6238-8181 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_technicalreports 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons 
Citation 
Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. "What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?" Upjohn Institute 
Technical Report No. 18-035. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
https://doi.org/10.17848/tr18-035 





WHAT WORKS TO HELP
MANUFACTURING-INTENSIVE 
LOCAL ECONOMIES?





300 S. Westnedge Ave.
Kalamazoo, MI  49007-4686
www.upjohn.org 
MAY 2018
I appreciate research assistance and other support from Nathan Sotherland and Claire Black, and editing from 
Ben Jones. I received helpful comments at a seminar from my colleagues at the Upjohn Institute. I also 
appreciate additional helpful comments on this project from Sue Houseman and George Erickcek. This 
research was in part financially supported by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities as part of its Full 
Employment Project.  A policy brief based on this report is being simultaneously published by CBPP’s Full 
Employment Project.  I appreciate comments from Jared Bernstein and Ben Spielberg of CBPP. The findings 
and recommendations of this report are those of the author, and should not be construed as reflecting the views 
of CBPP, the Upjohn Institute, or any of those providing comments or assistance. 
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The mediocre job growth of the United States since 2000 has generally been much worse 
in the most manufacturing-intensive communities, that is the communities that had above 
average shares of their jobs in manufacturing industries.  For example, consider the recent 
business cycle with the worst manufacturing decline, from the business cycle peak of 2000 to the 




 Grand Rapids is “manufacturing intensive” in that the share of manufacturing jobs in 
total jobs in Grand Rapids is significantly above the national average share. As of 2000, 
manufacturing’s share of total jobs in Grand Rapids was twice the average national share.1  
                                                 
1 Specifically, the Grand Rapids “location quotient” for manufacturing jobs—the share of manufacturing 
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Figure 1 Job Trends, Grand Rapids and U.S., 2000–2007
NOTE:  Overall job growth is private-sector job growth. Job growth percentages are calculated as percentage 
differences (e.g., difference from 2000 to 2007 divided by average of 2000 and 2007).  Job data are from the Upjohn 
Institute’s WholeData database, which is derived from County Business Patterns data, using an algorithm originally 
developed by Isserman and Westervelt (2006). 
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 From 2000 to 2007, the nation had modest job growth: private-sector job growth was 5.7 
percent. But over the same period, private jobs in Grand Rapids declined by 6.2 percent.   
This overall jobs decline in Grand Rapids was largely due to local manufacturing’s 
collapse. From 2000 to 2007, manufacturing jobs in Grand Rapids dropped by 26.9 percent, 
somewhat greater than the national decline in manufacturing of 21.2 percent.  But because Grand 
Rapids’ manufacturing intensity was twice the national average, the Grand Rapids manufacturing 
decline was much more severe as a percentage of total jobs.  As a percentage of total private-
sector jobs, manufacturing jobs from 2000 to 2007 in Grand Rapids declined by 7.1 percent; in 
the United States, the decline in manufacturing jobs as a percentage of total employment was 
“only” 2.7 percent.  As will be discussed in more detail later, we expect changes in 
manufacturing jobs to have some “multiplier” effects on other local jobs in suppliers or retailers. 
An average manufacturing job multiplier would be expected to be in the range from 2 to 3: for 
every one job lost or gained in manufacturing, one or two additional local jobs are lost or gained.  
With a multiplier in this range, the Grand Rapids manufacturing job loss from 2000 to 2007 fully 
explains why the area’s overall job growth was over 11 percentage points less than the nation’s.2  
 What can be done to help manufacturing-intensive communities?  Is the answer simply 
slashing local business costs—for example, by cutting local wages and local business taxes? Is 
the answer large tax incentives, such as the over $4 billion recently offered by Wisconsin to 
Foxconn, in exchange for Foxconn opening up a flat-screen TV manufacturing facility near 
Racine? 
                                                 
2 The difference in the manufacturing decline as a percentage of total employment in Grand Rapids (−7.1 
percent) versus the United States (−2.7 percent) was −4.4 percent. The difference in overall job growth in Grand 
Rapids (−6.2 percent) versus the nation (5.7 percent) was −11.9 percent. Dividing the total employment-decline 
difference by the manufacturing decline as a percentage of the total difference yields 2.70—or, in other words, the 
overall job decline could be explained if manufacturing in Grand Rapids had a multiplier effect of 2.70, which 
seems quite plausible.  
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 This report argues against these simple economic development strategies, which directly 
slash business costs. Across-the-board wage cuts or business tax cuts can sometimes create jobs, 
but at a very high price per job created. Untargeted business tax reductions may even be 
counterproductive, by cutting education and other public services which support long-term local 
economic development. Business tax incentives may sometimes work, but only if targeted on 
high-multiplier businesses, and financed without significantly cutting productive public services 
such as education.    
 What policies are more likely to work? A more cost-effective approach emphasizes 
targeted public spending programs, which either 1) increase the quantity or quality of local labor 
demand or 2) improve the quality of local labor supply. The local fiscal multipliers of public 
spending are surprisingly high, according to recent evidence, so such spending can have 
significant short-term effects in creating jobs. But the long-term economic development benefit 
is from public spending’s “supply-side” effects: the expanded public spending programs can help 
the local community become a better place to create and grow competitive businesses.  
 Based on research, among the public services that can cost-effectively promote local 
economic development are customized services to small and medium-sized businesses. Such 
services include customized job training. Customized job training is typically run by local 
community colleges; the training is “customized” in that it trains existing or new employees of a 
specific employer, and provides the specific job skills needed by that individual employer. Other 
cost-effective customized business services include manufacturing extension services. Such 
manufacturing extension services are targeted at small and medium-sized manufacturers. 
Manufacturing extension provides such manufacturers with access to lower-cost, high-quality 
advice on how to improve their sales and productivity.  
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 Long-term economic development also can be cost-effectively promoted by well-targeted 
investments in improving the quality of local human capital.  Such human capital investments 
can take several forms: high-quality preschool, higher K–12 spending, high school career 
academies, scholarship programs that increase educational attainment at local colleges and 
universities, job training programs run by community colleges that are closely tied to employers’ 
skill needs, and wage subsidy programs that encourage businesses to hire and provide on-the-job 
training to the unemployed.  A high percentage of the participants in such human capital 
programs will remain in the local economy for most of their working careers. According to 
research studies, higher local skills are a key factor promoting long-term local economic 
development.  
 Finally, long-term economic development can be increased by increases in land supply, 
both for new business development and new housing development. More land supply for 
business development can directly boost local labor demand by providing a broader array of 
available sites. More land supply for housing development can indirectly boost local labor 
demand by leading to lower local prices and nominal wages, which will lower business costs. 
Increasing land supply availability is in part accomplished by regulatory changes in zoning and 
land use rules. But land supply is also affected by a wide variety of infrastructure improvements. 
For example, improving highways or mass transit, or installing utility lines, makes more land 
readily available for development. For many older cities, cleaning up brownfields also can pay 
off, promoting both neighborhood development and the overall area. In distressed 
neighborhoods, public service investments can encourage job growth.   
 This report will proceed as follows: 
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1) First, the report shows how the post-2000 decline in manufacturing jobs has 
disproportionately affected manufacturing-intensive communities.  
2) Second, the report summarizes the research evidence on the benefits and costs of alternative 
local economic development strategies, such as business tax incentives and customized 
business services.   
3) Third, the report presents evidence on the success of some manufacturing-intensive 
communities, and examines what explains that success.3   
THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE FACING MANUFACTURING-INTENSIVE 
COMMUNITIES 
 The economic challenge facing manufacturing-intensive communities is the huge job 
decline in U.S. manufacturing. This decline was most intense over the 2000-to-2007 business 
cycle, but has continued since then at a lesser rate.  
 As Table 1 shows, U.S. manufacturing jobs declined 21.2 percent from 2000 to 2007. 
From 2007–2015, U.S. manufacturing jobs declined another 13.8 percent. 
 Why have U.S. manufacturing jobs declined? Some media reports suggest that U.S. 
manufacturing output growth is fine, but that manufacturing job growth is depressed by 
automation. But research by Susan Houseman (2018) has shown that this narrative is false: most 
of the post-2000 decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs is not due to automation. Instead, the post- 
                                                 
3 This report builds on previous work that also quantifies the benefits and costs of state and local economic 
development policies (Bartik 1991, 1992, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2016, 2018).  This report differs from this previous 
work in the following ways: 1) this report focuses on manufacturing-intensive communities, 2) this report is 
significantly more comprehensive in the range of economic development policies considered, 3) this report is 
updated to include the latest research findings, and 4) this report includes significant new empirical work that 
examines the success or failure of manufacturing-intensive communities.  This report differs from some other 
related research reviews—for example, the recent book by Wolman et al. (2017) that considers what makes a region 
“resilient” in response to a wide variety of economic shocks—in that this report focuses on trying to quantify in 
dollar terms the benefits and costs of economic development policies. 
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All private jobs 113.888 120.599 124.048 6.712 3.449 10.161 5.7 2.8 8.5 
Mfg jobs 16.471 13.320 11.605 (3.151) (1.714) (4.865) (21.2) (13.8) (34.7)
Mfg as % of private 
jobs 
14.5 11.0 9.4 
Mfg % difference out 
of private jobs 
    (2.7) (1.4) (4.1) 
NOTE: Data come from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData database, which is derived from County Business Patterns. All measures 
of jobs are in millions of jobs. Declines in jobs are indicated with parentheses. Percentage change is calculated as percentage 
differences on base of average of first and second periods.  
 
 
2000 decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs is due to U.S. manufacturing firms losing market share.4 
This loss of market share is a combination of increased U.S. imports of manufactured goods and 
decreased U.S. manufacturing exports. With the exception of computers and electronics, U.S. 
manufacturing output is not doing well. In the computer and electronics sectors, more positive 
trends in productivity and output are due not to automation but to statistical adjustments for 
product quality improvements. The U.S. has lost world market share in the manufacturing of 
computers and electronics.   
The post-2000 decline in U.S. manufacturing’s market share and jobs has had major 
consequences, both for U.S. workers and for manufacturing-intensive areas. Low manufacturing 
job growth is a drag on the entire U.S. economy. A conservative estimate is that the 
manufacturing job multiplier is at least somewhere between 2 and 3—for every one job in 
manufacturing, there are at least one or two other jobs created in the economy.5 As shown in 
                                                 
4 Why have U.S. manufacturing firms lost market share? A full exploration of that question is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Research by Campbell (2016) suggests that for the 1995–2008 period, at least two-thirds of the 
decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs can be explained by changes in the real exchange rate, and by persistence of U.S. 
job declines due to “hysteresis” effects.   
5 A multiplier of 2 or 3 is a reasonable estimate for manufacturing for local areas. For example, BEA input-
output multipliers at the local level for manufacturing seem to average around 2.5 (e.g., see their Kansas City 
estimates for multipliers at BEA [1997]). Moretti (2010) reports empirically based multipliers of 2.59 if we only 
include impacts of manufacturing on nontradable industries, and 2.85 if we also include possible impacts on other 
manufacturing. Moretti’s multipliers would tend to be somewhat greater than input-output multipliers because they 
include potential agglomeration economies. These multipliers would be the multiplier effects before considering 
negative feedback effects from higher wages and prices, as these multipliers reflect the realized relationship between 
manufacturing job changes after considering such feedback effects and other job changes that also consider such 
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 7 
Table 1, the manufacturing job decline, as a percentage of total jobs, was 2.7 percent from 2000 
to 2007 and another 1.4 percent from 2007 to 2015. With a multiplier of 2 to 3, this implies that 
if U.S. manufacturing jobs had just stayed stable, overall U.S. employment growth would have 
been boosted by 5 to 8 percentage points in the 2000 to 2007 period, and by 3 to 4 percentage 
points in the 2007 to 2015 period.    
 Manufacturing-intensive areas have done even worse. In Table 2, I focus on the 324 
“commuting zones” that in 2000 were significantly above average in their share of total 
employment in manufacturing jobs.6 “Commuting zones” are defined by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture as groupings of counties within which there are sufficient commuting flows that one 
would expect relatively quick adjustment of wages and employment rates throughout the 
commuting zone in response to shocks to local labor demand or labor supply. Commuting zones 
are broadly similar to metropolitan areas in how they classify counties, but have the advantage 
that all 3,000-plus counties in the United States, including counties in rural areas, are classified 
into a commuting-zone area. The entire United States is divided into 709 commuting zones.  
 To get an idea of what areas are “manufacturing intensive,” among the 324 
manufacturing-intensive commuting zones are these 15 areas above one million in 2010 
population: Detroit, Michigan; Cleveland, Ohio; Silicon Valley, California; Charlotte, North  
                                                 
feedback effects. Multipliers at the national level might be even higher, at 6 or 7, because they consider effects on 
suppliers throughout the nation. For example, an unconstrained version of the REMI model estimates a national 
manufacturing jobs multiplier of 6.65 (Robey et al. 2017). At the national level, however, one needs to consider 
constraints stemming from Federal Reserve Policy and exchange rates. If U.S. manufacturing somehow became 
more competitive and expanded its exports, this would presumably have some offsetting effects on the exchange 
rate. In addition, if the expansion of jobs from manufacturing and its national multiplier put some upward pressure 
on wages and prices, presumably this would lead to some responses from the Federal Reserve. Estimating the net 
national impact is a difficult issue. However, the realized multiplier after considering feedback effects may still be 
considerably higher than 2 or 3, depending upon how exchange rate responses and Federal Reserve responses affect 
manufacturing relative to other industries.  
6 A “manufacturing-intense” commuting zone (CZ) is somewhat arbitrarily defined as a CZ whose 
manufacturing “location quotient” (share of area jobs in manufacturing divided by national share) exceeded 1.19 in 
the year 2000. As it turns out, this cutoff came in a gap in the distribution of CZ location quotients, and it seemed to 
classify commuting zones in a way that made intuitive sense.  
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Table 2  Trends in 324 Commuting Zones (CZs) That Were Manufacturing-Intensive in 2000 (in millions of 
jobs or in percentage terms) 
Panel A: Selected Comparisons of 324 CZs to U.S. as a Whole 
 




Private jobs as % of U.S., 
2000 
26.9 
Manufacturing jobs as % 



























All private jobs 30.580  30.283 29.754 (0.297) (0.529) (0.827) (1.0) (1.8) (2.7)
Manufacturing jobs 7.336  5.771  5.081 (1.565) (0.690) (2.255) (23.9) (12.7) (36.3)
Manufacturing as % of 
private jobs 
24.0 19.1 17.1 
Manufacturing % change 
out of private jobs 
      (5.1) (2.3) (7.5) 

















All private jobs 113.888 120.599 124.048 6.712 3.449 10.161 5.7  2.8  8.5 
Manufacturing jobs 16.471 13.320  11.605 (3.151) (1.714) (4.865) (21.2) (13.8) (34.7)
Manufacturing as % of 
private jobs 
14.5 11.0 9.4 
Manufacturing, % change 
out of private jobs 
   (2.7) (1.4) (4.1) 
NOTE: Derived from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Commuting zones are considered 
manufacturing-intensive if location quotient for manufacturing exceeds 1.19 in the year 2000. Jobs are in millions. Percentage 
change over time is calculated as percentage difference on average of two time periods.
 
 
Carolina; Lancaster/Harrisburg/Lebanon, Pennsylvania; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Providence, 
Rhode Island; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania; 
Manchester, New Hampshire; Greensboro/Burlington/Danville, North Carolina and Virginia; 
Dayton, Ohio; Rochester, New York; and Greenville, South Carolina.  
 As shown in Table 2, these manufacturing-intensive areas had a little more than one-
quarter of total U.S. jobs in 2000. But because of their manufacturing intensity, these areas had 
almost half of all U.S. manufacturing jobs in 2000. Because of this manufacturing intensity, this 
one-quarter of the United States suffered almost half of the 2000-to-2015 loss in U.S. 
manufacturing jobs.  
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As a result, this manufacturing-intensive one-quarter of all local economies not only lost 
manufacturing jobs since 2000 but also suffered declines in overall employment, both in the 
2000–2007 period and in the 2007–2015 period. The job loss was 1.0 percent from 2000 to 2007 
but increased to 1.8 percent from 2007 to 2015. But the percentage lag from the U.S. overall 
growth was greatest in the earlier 2000–2007 period, when these manufacturing-intensive areas 
were 6.7 percentage points behind U.S. overall growth of 5.7 percent. In the latter 2007–2015 
period, these 324 manufacturing intensive areas were “only” 4.6 percentage points behind the 
U.S. average growth of 2.8 percent. 
 As can be seen in Table 2, these manufacturing intensive areas did not suffer because 
manufacturing in these areas had a worse percentage job loss than the manufacturing base. The 
percentage loss was similar in the manufacturing-intensive areas to the U.S.  
But because these manufacturing-intensive areas had a higher percentage of their jobs in 
manufacturing, the manufacturing job loss had a larger aggregate effect on the overall economy. 
During the 2000–2007 period, the manufacturing job loss in these 324 CZs, as a percentage of 
total jobs, was 5.1 percent, versus 2.7 percent for the United States, a difference of 2.5 
percentage points.7 With a multiplier of 2 to 3, one would expect these manufacturing-intensive 
areas to have a job lag of 5 to 8 percentage points behind the United States. The actual job lag 
was 6.7 percentage points, so these manufacturing-intensive areas did exactly as expected based 
on their manufacturing intensity from 2000 to 2007.  
In the later 2007–2015 period, these manufacturing-intensive areas experienced a 
manufacturing job loss of 2.3 percent as a percentage of total employment, compared to a figure 
for the entire United States of 1.4 percent of total employment, a difference of 0.9 percentage 
                                                 
7 2.5 rather than 2.4 due to rounding.  
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points. With a multiplier of 2 or 3, this manufacturing loss gap would be expected to cause these 
manufacturing areas to lag behind the United States in overall growth by 2 or 3 percentage 
points. This is perhaps a little more than half of the 4.6 percentage point gap in total job growth 
that is observed.  Of the remaining job gap, plausibly some of that gap may be due in part to 
lagged effects of the 2000–2007 loss of manufacturing jobs.  
To summarize: the economic development fate of manufacturing-intensive areas has been 
significantly worse than that of the United States from 2000 to 2015, and this can largely be 
explained by the job declines in U.S. manufacturing.  
WHAT JOB-CREATION POLICIES CAN BEST HELP MANUFACTURING-
INTENSIVE AREAS?  
 What can work to help manufacturing-intensive communities? This section reviews the 
research evidence on specific job-creation policies.  
 My analysis will focus on costs and benefits per local job-year created. What is a job-
year? It is a job that is created for one year. For jobs that persist for multiple years, I calculate the 
average cost or benefit for each job-year over those years.8  
An oft-suggested job-creation strategy for economically struggling communities is this: 
become more competitive by lowering your business costs. Perhaps local workers need to accept 
lower wages. Perhaps local taxpayers need to accept higher household taxes or public service 
cuts, to pay for lower business tax rates or higher business incentives.  
                                                 
8 More specifically, I calculate the present value of costs or benefits, divided by the present value of job-
years created. The present value of both dollar costs and benefits, and job-years, are calculated with the commonly-
used social discount rate of 3% (Bartik, 2011; Moore et al., 2004).  
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 11 
 As this section of the report will show, this simple business-cost-reduction strategy is not 
supported by research. Lower real wages or lower business taxes may create jobs, but the cost 
per job-year created is too high.  Lower business taxes have particularly high costs per job-year 
created if the lower business taxes are financed by cutting public investments in local residents’ 
skills. 
 Higher business tax incentives can be more effective, but they still are relatively costly 
per job-year created. Greater cost-effectiveness of tax incentives requires that they be more 
targeted.  
 More effective economic development strategies invest in programs whose cost-reduction 
effects for business are some sizable multiple of their social costs to the general public. Such 
cost-effective policies include business-targeted services that raise business productivity, such as 
customized job-training programs and manufacturing extension programs. Such cost-effective 
policies services also include human capital development services targeted at households, such 
as high-quality preschool education, improvements in the quality of K–12 education, and 
demand-oriented job training programs. Finally, cost-effective policies may include regulatory 
changes, infrastructure improvements, and brownfield cleanups to provide more land for new 
development.  
 However, before getting into the research evidence on the costs of different job-creation 
policies, the next subsection reviews the evidence on job creation’s benefits. How much is 
another local job really worth? What dollar amount per “job-year” should state and local 
governments be willing to pay? 
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What Is a Local Job Worth? 
 At the local level, a new job is worth a lot less than what it pays. This is because the 
research literature suggests that when local job growth goes up, most of the new jobs go to in-
migrants, not local residents.9  
 There is no escaping the following logic: any increase in local employment must be 
divided up between an increase in the local employment-to-population ratio and an increase in 
the local population. After all, local employment mathematically equals the product of the 
employment-to-population ratio times the population. One or the other, or both, must go up when 
local jobs increase.  
 To put it another way, when new local jobs are created, they generate a job vacancy chain 
that is only terminated when the new local jobs go to either 1) local residents who otherwise 
would not be employed or 2) newcomers to the local area. In the first round of hiring, it might 
seem that the new local jobs could also go to a third category: 3) local residents who were 
already employed. But the hiring from this third category, local residents who are employed, 
leads to another local job vacancy. That job vacancy in turn is filled in the same three ways. As 
the job vacancy chain proceeds, eventually all the new jobs result in either jobs for local 
residents who otherwise would not be employed, or jobs for in-migrants. Those local residents 
who otherwise would not be employed include two groups: local residents who were officially 
unemployed; and local residents who were not searching for jobs and hence were not considered 
to be in the labor force.  
                                                 
9 What about from a national perspective? From a national perspective, should the gains to in-migrants who 
take the new jobs be counted? Not necessarily. If job growth had not gone up in this one local area, the in-migrant 
could have moved elsewhere and have been almost equally well off. The marginal in-migrants attracted to this local 
area by this area’s job creation are relatively indifferent between staying where they are, or moving to other local 
areas, versus moving to the specific local area in question. See Bartik (1991).  
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 The research literature suggests that within a very few years, this logic plays out so that 
when new jobs add x percent to area employment, local population goes up by over 80 percent of 
x percent. More precisely, a good estimate is that the percentage of new jobs that go to the local 
nonemployed is about 15 percent.10 The remaining 85 percent goes to in-migrants.11 
 Average wages per full-time equivalent (FTE) worker in the U.S. economy are around 
$60,000 per year.12 Therefore, in terms of local residents’ earnings from higher employment-to-
population ratios, the average new local job is worth about 15 percent times $60,000 per year, or 
around $9,000 per job-year. 
 Benefits from a local job-year are also due to other factors, but these factors are more 
minor. Local jobs may also provide some fiscal benefits and property-value boosts, but these 
benefits are significantly less than benefits from a higher employment-to-population ratio (Bartik 
2018). Local jobs may boost local real wages, but this has costs for local employers. In addition, 
we might want to allow for some losses due to reduced nonworking time, which may have some 
net positive value even if unemployment has stigma effects.13 
                                                 
10 This percentage goes up when the prevailing local unemployment rate is high (Bartik 2015). Better local 
job training and matching systems might also be able to increase this percentage, but the efficacy of such policy 
reforms is unknown.  
11 The 15 percent and 85 percent figures come from a model of local economies that compares the present 
value of jobs created over an 80-year period with the present value of the jobs that go to local residents over that 
same 80-year period (Bartik 2018). These estimates rely on Bartik (2015) but also make plausible inferences about 
long-run depreciation of effects due to mortality and out-migration.  
12 This figure is from 2015, and is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. All dollar figures in this 
report, unless otherwise mentioned, are in 2015 dollars.  
13 The issue of the net value of non–work time is not settled. Some estimates suggest that the purely private 
value of non–work time might be 13 to 35 percent of earnings, including any unemployment benefits (Borgschulte 
and Martorell 2016), and that incremental changes in non–work time might be valued at 60 percent of earnings (Mas 
and Pallais 2017). On the other hand, direct survey evidence on determinants of human happiness find very negative 
effects of both individual unemployment and overall unemployment, sufficient to imply that being involuntarily 
unemployed might have a negative value (see review by Bartik [2012]).    
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 Overall, plausible values for the benefits per job-year from new local jobs probably are 
somewhere in the range from $5,000 to $20,000 per job-year.14 Job creation policies that exceed 
that range will find it more challenging to have net benefits. Job creation policies whose costs are 
between $5,000 to $20,000 may have positive net benefits—but these net benefits are likely to be 
moderate in size and dependent on the details of the policy and the local labor market. For truly 
sizable benefit-cost ratios, local job creation policies probably need to achieve costs per job-year 
of $5,000 or less.  Are there local policies that can do so? 
Lowering Real Wages is Much Too Costly to be Cost Effective as a Job Creation Strategy 
 Lower real wages will boost area job growth, but at a high cost per job-year. Based on 
empirical research, the long-run “elasticity” of local job growth with respect to local real 
wages—the percentage increase in local jobs as a ratio to the percentage decline in local real 
wages—is around minus 1.5.15 This means that if local real wages were to decline by 10 percent, 
local jobs would eventually increase by about 15 percent.  
 Given that local wages average around $60,000 per year, a 10 percent average decline in 
wages would be about $6,000 per job-year. This 10 percent decline in wages would boost local 
job growth by about 15 percent. The long-run cost per job would then be about $40,000 per job-
year—the $6,000 in wages sacrificed on the 100 percent of existing jobs, divided by the 15 
percent job boost.16  
                                                 
14 The model in Bartik (2018) yields a present value of benefits per present value of jobs created of 
$12,160. This model includes local residents’ earnings benefits, fiscal benefits, property-value benefits, and other 
local business effects, but assumes that foregone nonemployed time has exactly zero social value. This model also 
assumes 1.2 percent real wage growth per year.  
15 This elasticity of −1.5 is assumed in Bartik (2018) and in Kline and Moretti (2014b). Beaudry, Green, 
and Sand (2014) have estimates that imply a long-run metro area elasticity of about −1.5. Hamermesh (1993) 
suggests a range for the labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage, not holding output constant, from −1.0 to 
−1.5, but this is at the national level, where one expects the labor-demand elasticity to be less in absolute value.  
16 This rough calculation uses actual percentages and a 10 percent real wage reduction. The long-run costs 
would be a little less if we used logarithms, at about $35,000 per job-year.  
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 However, this long-run cost arrives only slowly, which raises the effective cost per job 
year. Estimates suggest that local economies, in response to a shock, converge to a new 
equilibrium at a rate of around 9 percent per year.17 To put it another way, only a minority of 
firms can immediately take advantage of lower wages to expand production.  
 The slow adjustment means that lower wages have much higher costs in the short run. 
For example, after one year, employment would only have adjusted 9 percent of the full 
adjustment. As a result, after one year the ratio of real-wage reductions to the employment 
increase would be 11 times its long-run costs (1 / 0.09 = 11), or more than $400,000 ($40,000 / 
0.09 = $444,444).  
 However, if we take a long-term perspective, the costs per job-year created are only 
moderately increased by the slow adjustment. The social-discount-rate literature suggests that 
future income should be moderately discounted, at about 3 percent annually.18 This implies that 
future dollar values are discounted but still important. For example, a dollar 10 years from now is 
worth $0.74 today, and a dollar 20 years from now is worth $0.55 today. Therefore, because 9 
percent per year adjustment means most adjustment takes place within 10 years, the long-term 
costs are more important than short-term costs in the present-value calculation.  Overall, if we 
take the present value of lower wage costs, divided by the present value of jobs created, the 
sluggish adjustment to lower wages increases the average cost per job-year by a little more than a 
quarter.  Costs per job-year would be around $50,000.19   
                                                 
17 See Helms (1985), or, more recently, Bartik (2017a) or Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016). 
18 See review by Bartik (2011, Chapter 7), or Moore et al. (2004).  
19 This calculation assumes 9 percent adjustment per year and a 3 percent social discount rate, and it uses 
absolute percentages and a 10 percent wage reduction. More precisely, the present value of forgone wages divided 
by the present value of job-years created is around $52,000. If we used the logarithms of wages and jobs to make the 
calculation, and a log percentage wage reduction of 0.10, we get a present-value cost per present value of job-years 
of around $46,000. In addition, if we also allowed for real-wage increases over time, we would get somewhat higher 
costs per job created, but also somewhat higher benefits per job. But the higher costs per job would dominate as the 
benefits in terms of higher employment rates tend to depreciate over time, while the wage reductions persist. As 
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 Why don’t lower wages do more to boost local job growth? One possible reason is that 
lower wages also affect lower worker morale and raise worker quits, thus lowering worker 
productivity. As a result, lower wages don’t lower business costs as much as one might think. 
Another possible reason is that lower wages may also redistribute income from local labor to 
owners of capital; this redistribution may negatively affect demand for local goods and services. 
Finally, different local economies in the United States are quite imperfect substitutes for one 
another, because of local ties of both labor and capital, and therefore modest cost changes of any 
kind do not have overwhelming effects on local job growth.  
Business Tax Cuts Are Also Costly per Job-Year, Particularly if Financed by Cutting 
Productive Public Services 
 Based on empirical research, business tax cuts have a larger effect per dollar than wage 
cuts in increasing local jobs. A 10 percent reduction in state and local business taxes – while still 
holding the quality of public services constant --  would be expected to  increase long-run jobs in 
an area by 5 percent.20 State and local business taxes average around $7,000 per job.21 Therefore, 
in the long run, holding public services constant, business tax cuts will have a cost per job 
created of around $14,000 per job—a 10 percent cut in business taxes will reduce business taxes 
by $700 per job but will increase jobs by 5 percent, so the annual cost per job-year created is 
$700 / 5% = $14,000.  
                                                 
mentioned above, the model in Bartik (2018) gets a present value of benefits from jobs created, divided by present 
value of job-years created, of around $12,000, with a 1.2 percent annual real-wage trend assumed. The same model, 
with 1.2 percent annual real-wage trend, gets a present-value cost of real-wage reductions versus the present value of 
jobs created of $76,000 in the logarithmic formulation, and $86,000 in the absolute percentage formulation. I ignore 
this in this report, as these assumptions about real-wage trends may be questionable and are not needed for this 
report’s arguments.  
20 This 0.5 elasticity is the average for studies using area fixed effects and controlling for public services in 
the comprehensive review of the literature by Bartik (1992). This elasticity is also consistent with the meta-analysis 
of the research literature by Phillips and Goss (1995). A 0.5 elasticity is also consistent with more recent work by 
Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016).  
21 State and local business taxes average about 5 percent of business value-added (Bartik 2017a; Phillips, 
Sallee, and Peak 2016). Business value-added is about $140,000 per full-time equivalent (FTE) worker (BEA).  
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 17 
 However, as with lower real wages, the economy doesn’t instantly adjust to lower 
business taxes. For example, if the economy adjusts at 9 percent per year, the cost per job created 
in the first year is 11 × $14,000, or over $150,000.  
However, as with real wages, if one takes a long-term perspective, with a modest social 
discount rate, the long-term costs per job-year tend to dominate. If one takes a present-value 
average of the tax cost per job-year created, the cost per job created is increased a little over one-
quarter, to around $18,000 per job-year.22 
 But business tax cuts must be financed in some way. Given that state and local 
governments must balance their budgets, business tax cuts must be financed by either cuts in 
public spending or increases in other taxes. Either public spending cuts or tax increases will have 
negative “demand-side” and “supply-side” effects on local economic development. The negative 
demand-side effects occur because either public spending cuts or tax increases will reduce 
demand for locally produced goods and services. The negative supply-side effects occur because 
either public spending cuts or tax increases may reduce the quantity or quality of local inputs 
supplied to business. For example, either public spending cuts or tax increases may reduce the 
quantity or quality of local labor supply. 
 Based on recent research evidence, these local demand-side and supply-side effects of 
spending cuts or tax increases may be surprisingly high, even in the short run (Bartik 2017b; 
Suárez Serrato and Zidar 2016; and Zidar 2017). That is, the so-called fiscal multiplier effects of 
state/local spending changes or tax changes are surprisingly high: relatively modest changes in 
                                                 
22 This again uses absolute percentage adjustments, a 3 percent social discount rate, and a 9 percent 
adjustment per year, and it assumes no real wage growth over time. The logarithmic formulation for a 10 percent tax 
reduction gets a present-value cost of around $17,000 per job-year. If we assume 1.2 percent real-wage growth per 
year, the cost per job-year figure goes up to around $30,000 in the absolute percentage formulation, $28,000 in the 
logarithmic formulation.  
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state/local spending or taxes have large job creation or destruction effects. To put it the opposite 
way, the cost per job created or destroyed by state/local spending changes or tax changes is 
surprisingly low. In addition, it is plausible that these short-run fiscal multipliers may understate 
the long-run economic development effects of state/local budget policy, particularly for 
education spending and infrastructure spending. 
 Consider first the local economic development effects of public spending cuts. Recent 
research suggests that the short-run “job multiplier” of public spending cuts at the local level, 
reflecting in part short-run demand effects, is about $34,000 (Bartik 2017b; Suárez Serrato and 
Wingender 2016). This means that each $34,000 in public spending cuts destroys one local job. 
Therefore, if business tax cuts are financed by cutting public spending, the short-run negative 
effects of the lower public spending probably exceed the short-run positive effects of the 
business tax cuts. Even in the long run, the negative effects of public spending cuts on local jobs 
will be more than half as large as the jobs created by business tax cuts.  
 Therefore, even ignoring longer-run effects, these short-run fiscal multiplier effects of 
public spending cuts significantly increase the net costs of job creation because of business tax 
cuts. With a $18,000 present-value cost per job-year created by business tax cuts, and each 
$34,000 in public spending destroying one job, one can calculate the net cost per job created of 
business tax cuts financed by public spending cuts. This net cost per job created from this 
balanced budget change works out to be about $38,000 per job-year.23  
 These fiscal multiplier effects only include the demand-side and supply-side effects of 
public spending cuts that occur in the short run. Long-run effects may occur from some types of 
public spending cuts. Consider public spending cuts in K–12 education. Jackson, Johnson, and 
                                                 
23 $38K = 1 / [(1/$18K) − (1/$34K)].  
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Persico (2016) calculate that higher K–12 public school spending forced by court orders 
increases long-run earnings sufficiently that the present value of such earnings is 4.95 times the 
increased K–12 spending.24 The implication is that the earnings losses from cutting K–12 
spending will be a sizable multiple of the spending cuts. Most of these earnings increases will 
take place far in the future, when former K–12 students reach their peak earnings years in their 
40s and 50s, but the present-value calculations discount these future earnings increases to their 
value today.  
 At the local level, about 55 percent of those who spent their childhood in a metro area 
will spend most of their working career in the same metro area (Bartik 2009). The implication is 
that local spending cuts to K–12 education may directly lower local wages by about 2.72 times 
the spending cut (2.72 = 55% × 4.95).  
Furthermore, research by Moretti (2004) suggests that improving some individuals’ 
education creates sizable education “spillovers” on others’ wages. An individual’s wages depend 
not only on her own education and skills, but also on the education and skills of other workers in 
the same metro area. These spillovers of others’ education on my wages may reflect several 
economic forces:  
 Higher skills of my fellow workers may directly increase my productivity.  
 Higher skills of all workers at a workplace may enable an employer to be more aggressive in 
implementing new technology than if only some workers are skilled.  
 Skills of workers at some firms may lead to new ideas that improve the productivity of other 
nearby firms.  
                                                 
24 This recalculates the benefit-cost ratio using a 3 percent real discount rate. Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 
(2016) get a lower ratio of about 3 using a 6 percent real discount rate.  
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 Better skills in a firm’s local suppliers may improve the firm’s competitiveness and ability to 
pay higher wages.  
Moretti’s research suggests that education and skill improvements that directly increase 
some individuals’ wages by x percent will have spillover effects on others in the same metro area 
of about 86 percent of the direct effect, or a total multiplier of 1.86. 25 
 As a result, K–12 spending cuts will directly lower local wages by 2.72 times the 
spending cut, and will have spillover costs of 86 percent of that value, or 2.34 times the spending 
cut. The total loss in local earnings will have a present value of 5.06 times the spending cut  
(= 2.72 + 2.34).  
 Based on these short-run and long-run effects of education spending cuts, the net cost per 
job created from business tax cuts financed by education spending cuts would be quite high. This 
net cost would be over $230,000 per job-year created ($230,000 = $38,000 + $38,000 × 5.06).   
Net costs would be high even if only a portion of the public spending cuts come from 
spending with such additional long-run costs. For example, about 22 percent of state and local 
public spending is on K–12 education. Even if we assume that no other type of public spending 
has similar additional long-run costs, the net costs of business tax cuts financed by across-the-
board public spending cuts would be high. These costs would be over $80,000 per job created 
($80,000 = $38,000 + $38,000 × 22% × 5.06).  And, as we will see below, other types of public 
spending, such as infrastructure spending, may also have sizable effects on local economic 
development and local job creation in the long run.    
                                                 
25 Moretti (2004) estimates that a 1 percentage point increase in the college graduate share of a local 
economy increases others’ earnings by about 1.2 percent. Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2016) estimate that 
getting a college degree, compared to getting a high school degree, increases an individual’s earnings by 140.3 
percent. Therefore, the direct individual effect from 1 percent extra college-educated in the population is about 1.4 
percent (140 percent × 1 percent), and the external spillover effect is 1.2 percent (1.2% / 1.4% = 86%).  
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What about business tax cuts financed by increases in household taxes? Recent research 
by Zidar (2017) suggests household tax increases can have sizable short-run local fiscal 
multiplier effects, but only for household tax increases on the bottom 90 percent of the income 
distribution. For households in the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution, each $39,000 in 
higher household taxes destroys one job. No effect on local jobs is found from tax changes for 
the top 10 percent of the income distribution. This much lower or near-zero effect for the 
highest-income households may reflect in part that their consumption of local goods and services 
is not much affected by modest changes in tax liabilities.  
Suppose we consider the net job creation effects of business tax cuts, financed by across-
the-board increases in state and local household taxes. Estimates suggest that for the average 
state, about 58 percent of household taxes are paid by the bottom 90 percent of the income 
distribution.26 The resulting net cost per job-year created of household-tax-financed business tax 
cuts is around $24,600 {$24,600 = 1 / [(1/$18K) −0.58 × (1/39K)]}. This calculation may 
understate costs per job by omitting some additional long-run costs. For example, if higher 
household taxes lead to less employment in the short run, this lesser amount of work experience 
may reduce job skills of local workers in the long run.  
How will state and local business tax cuts generally be financed? Probably the method of 
financing will vary greatly from state to state, and over time. What matters will be the particular 
politics of a given time and place.  A relatively “neutral” assumption is that the average business 
tax cut is financed half by public spending cuts and half by household tax increases. Under this 
neutral assumption, the net cost per job-year created by business tax cuts will be $46,600 (= {1 + 
0.50 × 0.22 × 5.06} × {1 / [(1 / $18K) – 0.50 × 0.58 × (1 / $39K) – 0.50 × (1 / $34K)]}. 
                                                 
26 Calculations by Bartik (2018), based on ITEP (2015).  
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The upshot is that it is hard to make the case for across-the-board state and local business 
tax cuts, at least if viewed solely as a local economic development strategy. Benefits per job 
created are in the range of $5,000 to $20,000 per job-year. Costs per job-year are around $46,600 
under neutral financing assumptions, half through public spending cuts and half through 
household tax increases. Some types of financing are much worse. Financing by cuts in K–12 
spending costs over $230,000 per job-year. A case could be made for business tax cuts financed 
by household tax increases on the top 10 percent. This upper-income-financed business tax cut 
would result in costs of $18,000 per job-year created, which is toward the upper end of possible 
benefits per job-year. But even in this case, the benefit/cost ratio at best is only slightly above 
one.27 In any event, financing business tax cuts with increased taxes on upper-income 
households would require an unlikely political coalition that is interested in both lowering 
business tax burdens and increasing tax progressivity.  
Business Tax Incentives 
One alternative to across-the-board business tax cuts is business tax incentives. By 
“business tax incentives,” this report means tax reductions that are targeted on specific 
businesses making investment and job creation decisions. Sometimes these tax reductions are a 
legal entitlement that go to any business in specified categories (e.g., manufacturing firms) 
making particular types of investment and job creation decisions (e.g., job creation over a 
particular size threshold). Other times, these tax reductions are awarded with discretion, but 
27 The modest benefit-cost ratio means the efficiency benefits of this policy package would be modest. 
From a distributional perspective, the benefits from jobs created tend to be distributed progressively (Bartik 1994). 
Hence, an upper-income-financed business tax cut might make sense if one applied distributional weights to the 
gains and losses of different income groups.  
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nonetheless are commonly awarded to many businesses making job creation or investment 
decisions.  
Business tax incentives provided by state and local governments in the United States 
currently add up to about $43 billion annually (Bartik 2017a).28 The two largest types of such 
incentives are 1) job creation tax credits and 2) property tax abatements. A typical job creation 
tax credit (JCTC) allows a new or expanded business facility to keep some or all of the state 
income tax withholdings of the new workers it hires, for some number of years. (The workers are 
still credited by the state with making their required tax payments.) Depending upon the state 
income tax rate, such credits might be 3 percent of wages or more. Some JCTCs go for as long as 
15 years. Under property tax abatements, new or expanded business facilities pay reduced 
property taxes on the new facility and its associated machinery and equipment. Such property tax 
abatements also are frequently awarded for a multiple-year period—in some cases up to 20 
years. Because property taxes are the largest state and local business tax, averaging about half of 
state and local business taxes and sometimes being as large as $3,500 per worker job-year, such 
property tax abatements also can be quite sizable.   
The targeting of business tax incentives has two advantages, both of which reduce such 
tax incentives’ potential costs per job created relative to across-the-board business tax cuts. First, 
because business tax incentives are typically targeted on businesses considering new business 
investment or job creation decisions, tax incentive effects are more immediate. In other words, 
across-the-board business tax cuts are inefficient because they include the many businesses that 
are not currently considering investment decisions. Including all businesses results in 
considerable lags in effects. Business tax incentives avoid that inefficiency. Thus, business tax 
                                                 
28 This uses the $45 billion incentives figure from Bartik (2017a) but subtracts out the 5 percent of all 
incentives that are customized job training.  
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incentives have costs per job-year created of about the same as the long-run costs per job of 
business tax cuts—around $14,000 per job-year. Depending upon various assumptions about 
how the business tax incentives are structured, and how rapidly incented jobs depreciate, costs 
per job-year created are likely to be somewhere in the range from $10,000 to $20,000 per job-
year.29 One recent report estimates that the average U.S. incentive package is likely to have costs 
per job-year created of $16,000.30  
These costs per job created are much greater than typical incentive costs. The average 
state and local incentive package is around $1,600 per job-year.31 If 100 percent of the incented 
jobs would not have been created “but for” the incentive, then the cost per job-year would be 
only $1,600. But the available research on business taxes and incentives suggests that business 
investment decisions are not nearly cost-sensitive enough for incentives of $1,600 per job-year to 
trigger 100 percent of incented location or expansion decisions. In other words, state and local 
governments offer incentives to many location and expansion decisions. Many of these 
investment decisions would have occurred anyway; any state or local area will, even without 
incentives, attract many new location decisions or expansion decisions. The availability of 
incentives triggers additional location and expansion decisions. But given the wide variation 
across different areas in labor productivity, wage costs, transportation costs to market, and other 
                                                 
29 For example, the cost per job-year created from a typical incentive package may depend upon the extent 
to which it is front-loaded or back-loaded. Businesses use very high discount rates in making investment decisions 
(Poterba and Summers 1995). These high discount rates mean that front-loaded incentives have greater effects on 
business location and expansion decisions relative to the present value of their costs from a social perspective. The 
effect of front-loading versus back-loading on incentive costs per job-year created is shown in Bartik (2018).   
30 In simulations from a model developed for a forthcoming paper (Bartik 2018), it is estimated that if 
incentives are structured over time like the typical incentive package (Bartik 2017a), and if incented jobs depreciate 
at the rate of depreciation of manufacturing real estate (2.89 percent annually), then the present value of incentive 
costs divided by the present value of jobs created will be about $16,000, with present value calculated at a 3 percent 
real discount rate.  
31 This calculation is far less than the annual amount given if all firms get the maximum job-creation tax 
credit and property tax abatement, for two reasons. First, not all states have such generous incentives. Second, the 
calculation here considers the costs per job-year over an 80-year time horizon at a 3 percent discount rate, and most 
incentives die out after, at most, 20 years. This enormously lowers the net cost per job-year. 
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costs, the number of additional investment decisions triggered by a subsidy of $1,600 per job-
year is modest. A typical incentive package might tip 10 percent of all incented decisions. This 
10 percent tip rate implies the true cost per job-year is not the $1,600 average incentive cost per 
job year, but rather $1,600 / 10 percent, or 10 × $1,600, or $16,000 per job-year. State and local 
governments could do better, if only they had mind readers on staff to target just the investment 
decisions that would not have been made “but for” the incentive. But as reliable mind readers are 
nonexistent, state and local governments have little hope of tightly targeting incentives on 
marginal investment decisions. A higher percentage of location and expansion decisions can be 
tipped by increasing the incentive magnitude. But increasing incentive magnitude increases not 
only the tipping probability but also the costs, with little effect on the cost per job created.32 
The targeting of business tax incentives also has a second advantage: such incentives can 
be targeted at what regional economists call “export-base” businesses. Such export-base 
businesses are thought to be better targets than other local businesses because export-base 
businesses will have higher local job multipliers. By “export-base” businesses, regional 
economists mean a much broader category than businesses that sell their goods and services 
outside the United States. Export-base businesses include any business that sells its goods or 
services outside the local area. Export-base businesses also include businesses that sell their 
goods or services locally, but principally compete for business with “imports” from outside the 
local economy. In contrast, non–export base businesses sell their goods and services to local 
buyers and largely compete with other local businesses selling to the same customers.  
                                                 
32 For example, the highest-incentive states have incentives of about three times the average state. If we 
triple incentives to $4,800 per job-year, and this tips 30 percent of all incented firms making location or expansion 
decisions, then implied costs will still be $16,000 per job-year. As we increase incentive costs per job, at some point 
there are likely to be decreasing marginal returns, as it is impossible to tip more than 100 percent of incented firms.  
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If an export-base business expands in a local economy, that business brings new dollars 
into the local economy. The expansion of this business may reduce sales of other competing 
businesses, but such effects occur for competing businesses outside the local area. The new 
dollars brought into the local economy are spent in part on local suppliers. This leads local 
suppliers to add jobs and is one type of multiplier effect on local jobs. In addition, the workers in 
the expanded export-base business and its local suppliers will spend some of their increased 
earnings at local retailers, which will lead these local retailers to add jobs, and this adds another 
type of multiplier effect on local jobs. If an incentive or tax cut or other policy induces the 
creation of x jobs in an export-base business, the total job creation in the local economy will be 
some multiplier m × x jobs, where m is greater than 1. X jobs would be created in the incented 
firm, and (m − 1) × x jobs in local suppliers and retailers.  
In contrast, if some non-export-base business is induced by state or local policy to expand 
in a local economy, most of that business’s increased sales will be taken away from its local 
competitors. For example, if some incentive or tax cut causes a local McDonald’s restaurant to 
expand, it seems unlikely that this will significantly expand the overall number of local fast-food 
restaurant jobs. Even if the incentive or tax cut is “successful” in inducing the McDonald’s to 
expand, the likely consequence is that the Burger King down the street downsizes or closes. The 
net “multiplier” of the incented jobs is close to zero—even if the incentive triggers x jobs in the 
incented businesses, total jobs in the local economy will go up by some multiplier m times x 
jobs, where m will be much closer to 0 than to 1.  
From the viewpoint of creating local jobs, across-the-board business tax cuts are 
inefficient because they go to the majority of business that are non-export-base. Probably about 
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two-thirds of all private employment is non-export-base.33 The majority of business tax cuts that 
go to non-export-base businesses do little to boost local jobs.34 
In contrast, business tax incentives can be designed to target only export-base businesses. 
In practice, state and local governments do largely target incentives at export-base businesses, 
with some prominent exceptions.  Average incentive levels for export-base businesses are about 
nine times the average incentive levels for non-export-base businesses.  
Therefore, business tax incentives provided to manufacturers or other export-base 
businesses can have multipliers of greater than 1, meaning that the direct jobs created in the 
incented business lead to some spillover jobs created in other businesses. For manufacturing, a 
reasonable assumption about the net multiplier, considering both positive effects due to 
agglomeration economies and negative effects due to more local jobs increasing local prices, is 
about 2.35 
Therefore, if the cost per direct job of business tax incentives will generally be about 
$10,000 to $20,000 per job-year, and the net multiplier effect is around 2, the cost per all job-
years created will be in the range of $5,000 to $10,000. For the average business incentive 
package, for which the direct cost per job-year created is calculated to be $16,000 (Bartik 2018), 
the cost per job-year created including multiplier jobs would be $8,000.  
                                                 
33 As might be apparent, export-base is a matter of degree, with some gray areas where it is difficult to 
classify all firms in an industry as being export-base or non-export-base. For example, most hospitals may be non-
export-base, but this is not true of the Mayo Clinic. Bartik (2017a) classifies 45 NAICS industry categories as 
export-base, comprising 33.7 percent of total U.S. employment.  
34 Business tax cuts for non-export-base businesses will have some limited effects on local jobs, to the 
extent to which the businesses are locally owned and these business tax cuts lead to some increase in consumption 
spending on local goods and services by the local business owners.  
35 Moretti estimates a multiplier for manufacturing, including effects on both tradables and nontradables, of 
around 2.85. The model used in Bartik (2018) suggests that wage and price feedbacks will reduce the net multiplier 
associated with such an initial multiplier to about 1.96. Note that this net multiplier compared to the original 
manufacturing shock is about one-third lower than the gross multiplier before feedback effects. This gross multiplier 
before feedback effects is the appropriate multiplier to use when analyzing realized multipliers in data on local 
communities’ manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, as the feedback effects will reduce both manufacturing 
and nonmanufacturing proportionally.   
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If the business tax incentives could be financed without any other costs for the local 
economy, then we would say that the benefits and costs of business tax incentives would be 
closely balanced. Benefits are likely to be somewhere in the range from $5,000 to $20,000 per 
job-year. Costs are likely to be in the range of $5,000 to $10,000 per job-year. Whether any 
particular project would have benefits greater than costs would depend upon many details (Bartik 
2018). On the benefits side, benefits per job-year will be influenced by many factors. For 
example, what proportion of the jobs go to the local nonemployed? Given whether local public 
services and infrastructure have excess capacity, how does that affect the magnitude of fiscal 
benefits? On the cost side, costs per job will vary depending upon whether the incentives are 
front-loaded. Front-loading reduces the social costs of tipping location and expansion decisions 
of myopic business decision makers.   
However, the financing of the incentives may have significant economic costs. Business 
tax incentives for particular firms making location and expansion decisions may be financed by 
across-the-board business tax increases for all businesses, household tax increases, and public 
spending cuts of various kinds. This financing raises business tax incentives’ net costs per job 
created. If we assume that before financing costs are considered, gross costs per job-year created 
would be $8,000, the following are the calculated net costs per job-year under various financing 
alternatives: 
 Business tax financing: $14,400 = {1 / [(1/$8K) − (1/$18K)]}. 
 Household tax financing on the bottom 90 percent: $10,100 = {1 / [(1/$8K) − (1/$39K)]}. 
 Household tax financing on the top 10 percent: $8,000 (assuming zero fiscal multiplier of tax 
increases on this upper-income group). 
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 Average state/local tax mix financing: Based on figures that 44 percent of state and local 
taxes are business taxes and 56 percent are household taxes (Phillips, Sallee, and Peak 2016), 
we get net costs per job created of $10,800 = 1 / [(1/$8K) – 0.44 × (1/$18K) – (1 − 0.44) × 
(0.58) × (1/$39K)].36 
 K–12 spending-cut financing: $63,400 = (1 + 5.06) × {1 / [(1/$8K) − (1/$34K)]}.37   
 Across-the-board public spending cut financing, conservative assumptions about long-run 
spending productivity: Assuming that only 22 percent of public spending cuts have long-run 
productivity costs similar to K–12 education cuts, net costs of financing business tax 
incentives 100 percent by across-the-board public spending cuts are $22,100.  
 “Neutral” mix of tax-increase financing and public-spending-cut financing: Assuming 50 
percent of business-tax-incentive financing comes from across-the-board tax increases, and 
50 percent from across-the-board public spending cuts, we get $16,600.  
Therefore, for incentives to manufacturing firms with “average” net multiplier effects of 
2, the incentive policy’s likelihood of net benefits is highly dependent on how the incentives are 
financed. Incentives financed by cutting productive public spending—such as by cutting 
spending on K–12 schools—are very unlikely to make sense. Costs per job-year created are over 
$60,000, which far exceeds the likely benefits per job-year in the $5,000–$20,000 range. 
Average incentives are more likely to make sense if they are financed by increased taxes, not by 
public spending cuts. Within the tax-financing approach, progressive tax increases on higher 
income groups lead to lower net costs of job creation.  
                                                 
36 In this equation, the various offsets are multiplied by the tax shares that are appropriate. Forty-four 
percent of overall taxes are business taxes; (1 – 44 percent) are household taxes, and of those household taxes, 58 
percent are paid by the bottom 90 percent.   
37 In other words, there are short-run and ongoing fiscal multiplier costs at $34K in public spending cuts 
destroying one job, and additional costs in forgone earnings for future generations at 5.06 times the initial costs per 
job.  
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Incentives are more likely to pay off if we restrict incentives to only firms with the 
highest multipliers. For example, Moretti (2010) estimates that some high-tech manufacturing 
businesses may have gross multipliers (before considering feedback effects) as high as 6.0. The 
model by Bartik (2018) suggests that the resulting net multiplier, after considering feedback 
effects from higher wages and higher local prices, might be around 4.38 With a net multiplier of 
4, the cost per job of business tax incentives drops to $2,500–$5,000 per job-year, with a 
plausible “average” incentive package cost of $4,000 per job-year.  
This $4,000 per job-year would be the cost of high-multiplier targeted incentives if they 
were financed only by increases on taxes of households in the top 10 percent. But financing such 
high-multiplier incentives by K–12 spending cuts still wouldn’t make sense. Estimated costs of 
high-multiplier targeted incentives financing by K–12 spending cuts are $27,500 per job created.  
On the other hand, incentives financed by “neutral” budget policy, or better yet by tax 
financing, will have lower costs. If financed by “neutral” budget policy, half though spending 
cuts and half through tax increases, the net cost of high-multiplier incentives are $7,100 per job-
year. If financed by across-the-board tax increases, net costs per job-year are $4,600.  
High-multiplier targeting requires restricting incentives to only a portion of the range of 
industries currently provided with tax incentives. Depending upon how many industries truly 
have high multipliers, this restriction could result in significant reductions in resources devoted 
to incentives.39 For example, Moretti’s high-tech manufacturing sector makes up less than a 
quarter of total manufacturing jobs.40  If incentives were reformed to only provide incentives to 
                                                 
38 The estimated net multiplier after feedback effects is 3.91.  
39 The magnitude of multipliers is an active area of research. For example, Moretti’s evidence has recently 
been re-examined by Van Dijk (2018), although Van Dijk does not re-estimate the high-tech multipliers.  
40 Moretti mentions machinery and computing equipment and electrical equipment. These two areas 
comprised 2.5 million of the 12.1 million in FTE manufacturing jobs in 2015, according to BEA.  
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Moretti’s high-multiplier industries, total resources devoted to incentives might be reduced by 
over $30 billion annually.41  
Customized Business Services:  A Proven Way to Lower the Costs of Creating Local Jobs 
 Creating jobs by handing out cash to lower business costs is relatively expensive per job 
created. Each dollar of business tax cuts or business tax incentives can at best lower business 
costs by one dollar.  To lower the costs of job creation, one alternative is to see if there are 
policies that, for a given dollar of social costs, will lower business costs by more than one dollar. 
One such type of policy is high-quality customized business services that improve business 
productivity.  
 For customized business services, the most rigorous evidence for high productivity boosts 
per dollar is for manufacturing extension services and customized job training. Other customized 
services—for example, small-business development centers, business incubators, and business 
visitation programs—may also be cost-effective, but rigorous evidence is lacking.  
 Manufacturing extension services provide small- and medium-sized manufacturers with 
advice on how to improve their technology, workplace organization, and sales. Some of this 
advice is provided directly by staff of these manufacturing extension offices. Other advice is 
provided by referrals to reliable private consultants or faculty at local universities. Some advice 
is provided free, whereas other advice is provided for a fee. However, even with the fees, there is 
usually some explicit or implicit subsidy that reduces the costs to the business of using these 
advisory services.  
                                                 
41 Bartik (2017a) shows estimated annual incentive costs of around $45 billion in 2015. Around 95 percent 
of these costs are for business tax incentives. Reducing tax incentive costs by 75 percent would reduce annual 
business-tax incentive costs by $32 billion. This assumes that incentive costs would be reduced by about as much as 
the relative employment shares in different industries.  
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 Why should public policy seek to provide such advisory services? Why doesn’t the 
private market make sure that high-quality business advisory services are provided efficiently?42 
The benefit-cost argument for public intervention in this market is that without such intervention, 
small and medium-sized manufacturers will not get advisory services whose benefits exceed the 
costs of providing this information. That is, many small and medium-sized manufacturers could 
benefit from better advice on ever-evolving technology and markets. Such advice is relatively 
cheap to provide relative to the benefits, but an adequate private market is not automatically 
created to provide such beneficial advice. Obviously, there is a private market for advice. But 
evaluating the quality of information one does not possess is challenging. Manufacturing 
extension services help improve the market for advice by identifying advice of better quality. In 
addition, small and medium-sized businesses may have financial or cash flow issues that inhibit 
their ability to pay for high-quality advice. Finally, there are spillover benefits from better advice 
that go beyond the private benefits of the advice to the individual manufacturer receiving 
assistance. Some subsidy for the advice is rationalized by the benefits of greater manufacturing 
productivity for local economies and local workers. These market failures, due to imperfect 
information on quality, financing constraints of small business, and spillover benefits, justify 
some public policy intervention to improve the access of small and medium-sized manufacturers 
to higher-quality advisory services.  
 The Manufacturing Extension Partnership in the U.S. Department of Commerce helps 
support manufacturing extension offices in each state, with these offices often having multiple 
locations within a state. Annual federal funding for MEP is currently around $130 million per 
                                                 
42 Bartik (1990) and Kline and Moretti (2014a) are two attempts to review a wide variety of possible market 
failure rationales for various types of government interventions in local economic development.  
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year.43 This federal funding generally gets at least a 2-for-1 match by state and local funding and 
fee revenue. Therefore, annual resources devoted to manufacturing extension in the United States 
are currently around $400 million.  
 Customized job training programs provide businesses with job training that is designed to 
fit the individual business’s specific skill needs. The training is provided to workers already 
employed by the individual business, or workers whom the business intends to hire after their 
successful completion of training. Customized job-training programs in different states have 
diverse designs. Sometimes customized training programs are provided as part of incentive 
packages for a new facility location or a facility expansion. Sometimes a customized training 
program is provided to a business’s incumbent workers as part of an attempt to retain jobs 
(Hollenbeck 2013). Customized training is usually an in-kind service provided by local 
community colleges, although the training may be provided at the business’s sites. But in some 
programs, the customized training is provided via a grant to the individual business to deliver 
training using its own personnel.  
 A rationale for government subsidies or provision of customized job training is that 
businesses may underinvest in training. Even though such training is “customized,” much of the 
training provides skills that are general enough to be useful to a variety of employers. Therefore, 
many employers will be reluctant to invest in training that enables workers to get higher wages at 
other employers. In addition, many small and medium-sized businesses may lack expertise in 
providing training. Finally, some small businesses may find it difficult to afford the money and 
time required for high-quality intensive training.  For all these reasons, customized training may 
                                                 
43 The 2019 proposed federal budget from the Trump administration calls for eliminating this program—see 
https://www.vox.com/2018/2/13/17004590/trump-budget-cuts-manufacturing-michigan-west-virginia.  
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provide skills whose boost to local labor quality and wages exceeds the costs to government of 
providing the training.  
 Total costs of customized training programs are estimated to be around $600 million 
(Hollenbeck 2013).44 But this is below historical levels, which were around $900 million in 
2006.45 During the Great Recession, states significantly cut customized training programs.  
 For both manufacturing extension and customized training, natural experiments provide 
good evidence that these programs have “multiplier” effects on reducing business costs. For each 
dollar spent on these programs, business costs decrease by a multiple of at least 5 times greater.  
For manufacturing extension, Jarmin (1998, 1999) examined how these programs 
affected the manufacturing productivity of assisted firms. The firms assisted by manufacturing 
extension were compared with similar firms that happened to be located further away from local 
manufacturing extension offices.46   
 Based on Jarmin’s estimates, the productivity increase effects of manufacturing extension 
occur in the year in which the extension services were provided, and they persist for at least one 
additional year. If the productivity effects last for only two years, the resulting cost savings to the 
firm would be 5.4 times government costs of providing extension services. 
 For customized job training, Holzer et al. (1993) examined how customized job training 
assistance to an individual manufacturing firm affected the rate at which the firm’s products 
needed to be scrapped because of quality issues. The firms that received customized job training 
                                                 
44 This updates Hollenbeck’s estimate for FY 2011 spending, the latest available, to 2015 dollars. The exact 
estimate is $607 million in 2015 dollars.  
45 This updates Hollenbeck (2008) to 2015 dollars. The exact estimate is $884 million.  
46 More specifically, Jarmin (1999) succeeded in using a variable measuring whether an extension office 
was located in the metro area in which a manufacturing firm was located as an instrumental variable for whether a 
manufacturing firm received extension services.  
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services were compared with similar firms that applied for customized job training services, but 
that applied too late in the training program’s fiscal year to receive assistance.47  
 Based on Holzer’s estimates, the training grants reduced scrappage rates, both in the year 
in which the grant was received, and in at least the subsequent year. If these reduced scrappage 
rates are valued at the price of output, and if the reduced scrappage rates last for only two years, 
the cost savings to the firm would be 4.9 times the government costs of providing training 
services.  
 From these estimates, one would expect either manufacturing extension or customized 
job training to be much more efficient than business tax incentives in reducing costs. As a result, 
manufacturing extension or customized job training should be more cost-effective than business 
tax incentives in inducing firms to locate jobs in a location, expand jobs in that location, or retain 
jobs there. As discussed above, the estimated cost per directly induced jobs of business tax 
incentives might be in the range of $10,000 to $20,000 per directly induced job-year.  With a 
multiplier of 2, the cost per total local job-year created might be in the range of $5,000 to 
$10,000. Business tax incentives by their very design only lower business costs by at most one 
dollar per dollar of government cost. If manufacturing extension or customized job training 
lower business costs by at least five times their government costs, the implication is that these 
programs would have a cost per directly induced job of no more than one-fifth the cost of 
business tax incentives. In other words, the cost per directly induced job of manufacturing 
extension or customized training would be in the range of $2,000 to $4,000 per job-year, or even 
less if their cost-reduction effects last beyond what is directly observed in the available studies.  
                                                 
47 The program did not seem to apply any screening criteria for training grants other than “first come, first 
served.” 
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With a multiplier of 2, these customized business services would have a cost per local job-year 
created of $1,000 to $2,000, or even less.  
 More direct evidence also suggests that these customized business services have low 
costs per job created. A study by Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske (2008) of economic development 
incentives in Kentucky compared the effectiveness of customized job training and tax incentives 
in affecting overall job growth in Kentucky counties. Because these estimates consider total job 
growth, they correspond to estimates of affecting job growth that include multiplier effects. They 
estimated that customized job training created jobs at a cost of around $1,700 per job-year. This 
cost is around one-tenth of the cost per job created of tax incentives, which are estimated at 
$16,000 per job-year.  
 In addition, some studies have directly asked firms how manufacturing extension or 
customized job training have affected job creation. Economists are suspicious of such survey 
evidence, as they tend to assume that survey respondents may lie if they want to help promote 
the program’s continuation. However, for manufacturing extension and customized job training, 
these programs provide firms with in-kind services rather than cash. It is unclear why firms 
would want to promote such services unless firms find these services to be useful.  
 For manufacturing extension, Ehlen (2001) concludes from survey evidence that the 
short-run cost per job-year, even if the created jobs lasted only one year, is around $19,000. For 
customized job training, Hollenbeck (2008) concludes from survey evidence that the short-run 
cost per directly induced job, even if the induced jobs only last one year, is around $16,000.  
 The present value of program costs per present value of job-years will then depend on 
how fast these directly induced jobs depreciate. Even with relatively conservative depreciation 
assumptions, one ends up with relatively low costs per directly induced job-year. For example, 
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suppose we assume that directly induced jobs depreciate at the rate of annual depreciation of 
manufacturing capital stock, which is around 7.4 percent.48 Suppose we further use a social 
discount rate of 3.0 percent. Then the present discounted cost per present discounted value of 
job-years created will be about one-tenth of the short-run cost per job-year created. Therefore, 
the implication is that manufacturing extension has a present value of costs per present value of 
job-years directly induced of about $1,900, and customized job training’s costs per present value 
of job-years created is about $1,600. With a multiplier of 2, the cost per local job-year created is 
half as much, at $800 to $1,000 per job-year created.  
 Thus, there is good evidence that some customized business services can create local jobs 
at a cost of $1,000 to $2,000 per job-year. As mentioned, the benefits of an extra local job year 
are likely to be in the range of $5,000 to $20,000 per job-year. Therefore, the benefit-cost ratio of 
such customized services can be sizable—probably at least 2-to-1, and more likely over 5-to-1.  
 This discussion ignores the fiscal multiplier effects from these services. On the cost side, 
the financing of such services, from higher taxes or lower public spending, will have some local 
job effects, as was true of the financing of business tax cuts, or business tax incentives. On the 
benefits side, providing some services directly creates some jobs by hiring extra personnel to 
provide the customized training or manufacturing extension advice. However, because 
customized business services are so cheap per job created, the fiscal effects associated with their 
financing and spending are quite modest, at least compared to business tax cuts or incentives. In 
addition, there are some offsetting fiscal benefits from the spending on the customized services. 
Therefore, in general these fiscal effects do not much change the conclusion that customized 
business services are cheap per job created. The only exception is for financing from reduced 
                                                 
48 These depreciation figures come from BEA.  
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education spending, or other very high productivity public services. Such financing can offset 
wholly or in part any benefits from customized business services.  
In Table 3, I consider how fiscal effects alter the costs per job-year created of customized 
business services. These costs per job-year created from different financing are compared with 
the case of business tax incentives. For the calculations, I assume a base cost per job-year 
created, without considering fiscal effects of financing and spending, of $2,000 per job-year 
created for customized business services, and $8,000 per job-year created for business tax 
incentives. For customized business services, this is a conservative assumption. As discussed 
above, the true baseline costs, without fiscal effects, might be less than $1,000 per job-year 
created. 
 
Table 3  Costs per Job-Year Created of Customized Business Services vs. Business Tax Incentives, with and 






Without considering fiscal effects 2 8 
Financing by across-the-board tax increases 2 10.8 
Financing by reduced K–12 spending 12.1 63.4 
Financing by across-the-board public spending reductions 4.2 22.1 
Financing “neutrally”: half tax increases, half spending reductions 3.1 16.6 
NOTE: All costs are in thousands of dollars per job-year. Costs are rounded to nearest hundred. For customized business services, 
costs reflect both how they are financed and the fiscal benefits of more spending on these services.  
 
 
 Even with such financing effects, if we avoid drastically slashing the most productive 
public services, customized business services have a cost per job-year created that is typically 
less than the $5K–$20K range of likely local benefits from an additional job-year.49 Customized 
                                                 
49 As an example of the calculation, the $3,100 cost per job-year created from “neutral” financing of 
customized business services is the result of the following calculation: $3.1K = (1 + 0.11 × 5.06) × (1 / [(1/$2k) − 
0.22(1/$18K) − 0.28 × 0.58 × (1/$39K) − 0.50 × (1/$34K) + (1/$34K)]. The first term reflects the opportunity cost 
of the 11 percent that goes to school financing. The terms in brackets reflect the costs of 22 percent of the finding 
from increased business taxes, 28 percent times 58 percent of financing from the bottom 90 percent of households, 
half financing from public spending cuts, and the fiscal multiplier benefit from the direct spending on the services.  
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business services probably are at least five times more cost effective than business tax incentives 
in creating local jobs.   
 Customized business services have this further advantage: such services are most useful 
to small and medium-sized businesses, and many of these businesses are locally owned, which 
increases local multipliers. Small and medium-sized businesses benefit the most because such 
businesses are the most likely to have information barriers and financial barriers that make it 
more difficult for them to obtain high-quality manufacturing advice or job training on their own. 
If such small and medium-sized businesses are locally owned, local ownership has been shown 
in various studies to lead to greater use of local suppliers. This greater use of local suppliers 
might increase the local multiplier by 0.25 (Civic Economics 2007, 2013). In addition, local 
ownership means that any profit increase caused by these business services accrues to local 
owners. These local owners will spend some of this profit increase on local consumption goods, 
further spurring local demand. This contrasts with business tax incentives that go to nonlocal 
business owners, with the resulting profit increase generally not being spent locally. Some 
simulations suggest that local ownership may lower net costs per job created by around 10 
percent (Bartik 2018).  
 Customized business services may also have a political economy advantage: business 
demand for such services is to some extent limited by their effectiveness. In the case of business 
tax cuts or business tax incentives, there is an unlimited demand by business for cash provided 
by such tax reductions. More cash will always have a high demand from any business.  In 
contrast, for customized business services, there will not be business support for such services 
unless they have some usefulness in reducing business costs. Political support from business for 
services will tend to increase with the services’ effectiveness. This political dynamic creates 
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some useful pressure on customized service providers to make sure their services are in fact 
effective in lowering business costs.   
Public Services to Boost Human Capital Can Boost Wages 
 As mentioned above, the evidence suggests that increased K–12 spending can boost local 
wages, with the present value of the resulting local wage boost being estimated at about five 
times the spending increase (more precisely, 5.06).50 High-quality human capital programs also 
can work if their intervention is earlier or later in the life-cycle.  
 In the early education area, child care is very expensive, but even so, some high-quality 
child care programs have high local benefit/cost ratios. For example, the Abecedarian program, 
which was provided from six weeks after birth to age five in North Carolina, has local benefits 
for increased earnings that are estimated to have a present value of a little over three times 
program costs (more precisely, 3.31 times as great).51 About 40 percent of these benefits occur in 
the form of greater earnings for the former child participant. The other 60 percent occur because 
                                                 
50 To what extent is the local earnings boost from educational investments due to changes in the quantity of 
local jobs created, versus changes in the quality of local jobs created?  Research has not definitively answered this 
question.  However, the available research suggests most of the effect is on the quality of jobs, although there are 
some effects on the quantity of jobs.  For example, Wolman et al. (2017) summarized Hungerford and Wassmer’s 
(2004) review of the literature on the effects of K–12 spending on both personal income and jobs. Based on Helms 
(1985), Hungerford and Wassmer and Wolman et al. conclude that a property-tax financed increase of 0.1 percent of 
state personal income devoted to K–12 spending will increase nominal state personal income in the long run by 0.74 
percent.  This same fiscal change, based on Harden and Hoyt (2003), will lead to a 0.136 percent increase in state 
jobs. Based on Bartik (1991), each 1 percent increase in jobs increases local prices by 0.2 percent, so the 0.136 
percent increase in jobs should increase local prices by 0.0272 percent, which implies that real personal income 
increases by 0.7128 percent.  In addition, based on Bartik (2018) and the literature cited therein, each 1 percent 
increase in jobs increases population by 0.85 percent in the long run, so the 0.136 percent increase in jobs should 
increase local population by 0.116 percent.  The result is that, due to a property-tax-financed increase in K–12 
spending by 0.1 percent of state personal income, the state employment-to-population ratio would go up by 0.020 
percent, and state real personal income per capita would go up by 0.5972 percent.  The per capita earnings increase 
due to higher employment-to-population ratios would be about 3 percent of the real personal income per capita 
increase (3% = 0.020 / 0.5972).  See later empirical results in the current report on the local benefits from more 
college graduates, which also find that these benefits from more local education are more on the job quality side 
than the job quantity side. 
51 This figure is derived from taking the state returns calculated in Bartik (2011), adjusted from state to 
metro areas using the information in Chapter 9 and then adjusting for the spillover effects of education based on 
Moretti (2004).  
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of both short-term and long-term increases in earnings for the parents of participants. Free child 
care for five years enables many parents to accumulate more work experience and more 
education. This additional work experience and education increases parental wages and earnings 
in the long run, even after the program’s services have ceased when the child turns five.  
 High-quality preschool provides future earnings benefits for the local area that are almost 
six times program costs (more precisely, 5.72).52 These benefits are almost all due to increased 
future earnings for former preschool participants who end up living in the same metro area.  
 After K–12, college scholarship programs also can pay off. The Kalamazoo Promise 
scholarship program, which provides up to 100 percent tuition to any graduate of Kalamazoo 
Public Schools, increases college completion by about one-third (Bartik, Hershbein, and 
Lachowska 2017). The likely local earnings benefits from this program, only counting increased 
earnings due to the roughly 40 percent of program participants who are likely to return to 
Kalamazoo, are estimated to be over twice program costs.53 
 Job training programs have a bad reputation. But job training that is high quality, which 
provides skills that employers are looking for, can have a high payoff. A review of the literature 
on job training programs by Card, Kluve, and Weber (2017) suggests that training programs can 
increase employment rates by at least 5 percentage points. Training programs that subsidize 
employers to hire the unemployed, and that provide on-the-job-training, can increase 
employment rates by at least 15 percentage points.  
                                                 
52 This figure takes the figures from Bartik (2014), adjusts them to a typical metro area using Chapter 9 in 
Bartik (2010), and then applies the spillover estimates of Moretti (2004).  
53 This calculation takes the 5.32 benefit-cost ratio from Table 7 in Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 
(2016), and multiplies it by 40 percent. This calculation also ignores that a large percentage of the program’s 
scholarship costs provides a benefit to college students by subsidizing their tuition costs, even for students for whom 
the scholarship does not alter educational attainment. If we multiply a 40 percent local share of college graduates 
who stay in the local economy, times the ratio of earnings benefits to local additional resource costs, we get a 
benefit-cost ratio of 6.51 (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska, 2016, Table 8).  
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 Hollenbeck and Huang’s (2014) reviews of job training programs in the state of 
Washington suggest that training programs that go beyond basic skills to provide training for 
specific employer job needs can provide a high payoff. For example, Hollenbeck and Huang find 
that community college programs that provide worker professional and technical education, or 
worker training, have medium-term earnings impacts of over $4,000 per year, with a training 
cost of around $8,000 per trainee. Projected over a lifetime, these training programs would have 
local earnings benefits of many multiples of their costs.  
 A recent randomized control trial of Project Quest, a San Antonio program that targeted 
in-demand health care jobs, found very high returns (Elliott and Roder 2017). The program costs 
about $10,000 per trainee, and it increased earnings for training participants versus similar 
controls by $5,000 annually, as of six years after program entry, with earnings effects growing 
over time.  
 Thus, human capital programs throughout the life cycle, from birth to adulthood, can 
produce large earnings benefits. Furthermore, because many of the former program participants 
will spend most of their working career in the same metro area, these higher earnings benefits 
will occur locally, further boosting the local economy through demand effects. Research suggests 
that higher skills in a local area make up a key business climate factor, helping attract businesses 
considering location and expansion decisions (Glaeser and Saiz 2004).   
 However, several concerns might be raised about training programs. One concern is 
whether these programs produce short-term gains. The second concern is whether these 
programs do enough to directly create jobs.  
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 On the short-term gains side, some of these programs do produce short-term earnings 
gains. High-quality child care and job training programs can certainly produce significant 
earnings gains for a local economy within a five-year time horizon.  
 Other programs yield their major benefits over much longer time periods. The long-term 
nature of the most important benefits is true of preschool programs, as well as K–12 programs. 
However, these programs do provide some short-run job creation programs by the direct and 
multiplier effects of hiring additional K–12 and preschool staff. As mentioned previously, the 
local fiscal multiplier for public spending implies each extra $34,000 in annual spending will 
create one job-year (Suárez Serrato and Wingender 2016).  
This cost will have to be paid for by increased state and local taxes. These increased taxes 
can, potentially, quickly offset any short-run job creation effects. For example, financing by 
higher business taxes may destroy jobs.54 However, if the financing is done without increasing 
business taxes, then there may be significant and persistent short-run and medium-run job 
creation benefits. As mentioned previously, estimates by Zidar (2017) suggest that if these taxes 
are on households in the top 10 percent of the local income distribution, the negative local job 
effects of higher household taxes will be negligible.  
If public spending increases are financed by across-the-board increases in household 
taxes, some negative effects on job creation will occur because of increased taxes on the bottom 
                                                 
54 In the very short run, business tax increases only destroy about one job per $156,000 in tax cuts. In that 
case, the short-run job creation effects of public spending increases financed by across-the-board tax increases will 
be $55,000 per job ($55K = [(1/$34K) − 0.44 × (1/$156K) − 0.56 × 0.58 × (1/$39K)]), based on Zidar’s estimate 
that taxes on the bottom 90 percent have a fiscal effect of $39K per job, ITEP’s (2015) estimate that 58 percent of 
household state and local taxes are paid by the bottom 90 percent, and Phillips, Sallee, and Peak’s (2016) estimate 
that business taxes are 44 percent of overall state and local taxes. However, because the economy converges at 9 
percent toward a new long-run equilibrium because of higher business taxes, the cost per job created if the financing 
is from higher business taxes will escalate. By Year 12, the across-the-board tax increases will actually destroy jobs. 
This is before the economic development benefits from better preschool or better elementary school will really begin 
paying off for local economic development. If we arrange the financing from higher household taxes, this avoids 
those medium-term economic development costs.     
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90 percent of the income distribution. Based on estimates by Zidar (2017) and ITEP (2015), the 
net costs of a household tax–financed increase in public spending will end up leading to a cost 
per job created of around $69,000 per job-year.55 
Neither a cost of $34,000 per job-year nor one of $69,000 per job year is sufficiently low 
for these demand effects alone to justify these programs from a local economic development 
perspective. As mentioned above, the local value of jobs is probably between $5,000 and 
$20,000 per job-year. Therefore, the benefits from the short-run job creation of hiring additional 
preschool teachers or K–12 teachers might offset 15 to 45 percent of public spending increases 
financed by increased taxes on the top 10 percent, and 7 to 20 percent of the public spending 
increases financed by increased household taxes in general.  However, the point is that if short-
run effects are a concern, there are methods of financing preschool or K–12 programs that will 
provide some offsetting short-run and medium-run gains from job creation, while waiting for the 
long-run wage increases.  
The second concern is that these programs might be perceived as not doing enough to 
directly create jobs, even in times or places where unemployment is high. This is a legitimate 
concern. For example, demand-oriented job training programs are difficult to run effectively 
when employers are not doing much hiring.  
However, in times or places where unemployment is high, job training programs might 
usefully focus on well-targeted short-term wage subsidies for employers for creating new jobs to 
hire the long-term unemployed. One possible model is a program the state of Minnesota ran in 
the 1980s, called the Minnesota Emergency Employment Development (MEED) program. 
MEED provided wage subsidies equivalent in today’s dollars to about $12 per hour, for up to six 
                                                 
55 $69K = 1/((1/$34K) − 0.58 × (1/$39K)).   
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months, for both private and public employers who were willing to commit to hiring the long-
term unemployed and retaining them after the subsidy period was over.56 The jobs also had to be 
newly created jobs, rather than just job vacancies—a policy that helped reduce the displacement 
effects of the program on other workers.  
A crucial aspect of MEED’s program design was that it was not run as a tax credit or 
other program under which individual employers and workers were automatically program-
eligible. Rather, the program was administered by local job training agencies with considerable 
discretion. Specifically, these local job training agencies had the discretion to screen both 
unemployed workers and employers, and to decide which ones were the best fit for the program.  
By screening the unemployed, the program was able to identify long-term unemployed workers 
who, with some training, could be work-ready in both hard skills and soft skills.  Such screening 
helps avoid stigma effects that sometimes make wage subsidy programs counterproductive. 
(Many employers don’t want to hire someone whom the government has designated as 
disadvantaged.57) By screening prospective employers, the MEED program could identify 
employers who were willing to take some risk in the workers they hired, with appropriate 
training and screening. The MEED program was also able to make some effort to screen out 
employers who might seek to use a wage subsidy program in socially costly ways, such as hiring 
workers they would have hired anyway, or in firing workers after the wage subsidy had expired 
and then hiring a new, subsidized worker.  
Both case studies and survey evidence suggest that the MEED program led to some new 
job creation and new hires. Estimates suggest that the program created new jobs at a rate of a 
                                                 
56 See review of MEED program in Bartik (2001).  
57 The classic article making this case is Burtless’s (1985) analysis of a wage subsidy program for the 
disadvantaged that seemed to reduce the probability of the subsidized workers getting jobs. However, this was an 
entitlement program that encouraged welfare recipients to advertise their disadvantaged status.  
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one-time cost of $31,000 for one job.58 If the jobs depreciate at 7.39 percent annually, and 3 
percent is the figure used to discount future jobs, then the net cost per job-year is about $3,100 
per new job. If these jobs are export-base jobs (Minnesota’s program gave a priority to export-
base jobs) that have a multiplier of about 2, then the net present value cost per present value of 
job-year is around $1,600.  
Therefore, MEED’s job creation costs are similar to those of the more effective 
customized business services. This should not be surprising; MEED was to a large extent 
supplying customized services to business clients, both by screening potential job hires and 
providing some upfront training, before providing the wage subsidy. However, in addition, 
MEED specifically targeted these newly created jobs toward the long-term unemployed. This 
may increase the likely benefits of new jobs, as more of the new jobs will go to the local 
unemployed, and fewer to in-migrants.   
MEED evaluation is based on survey evidence, not on a good comparison group. But as 
mentioned, a meta-analysis of the training literature suggests that wage subsidy programs can 
increase employment rates by at least 15 percentage points (Card, Kluve, and Weber 2017). In 
addition, a study of a subsidized employment program in Florida suggests that earnings in the 
subsidized jobs group, compared to a similar eligible but unassisted group, increased by more 
than $2,000 during the initial post-program year (Roder and Elliott 2013). These results are 
promising, although it would be desirable to have more evidence from studies with more 
rigorous designs.  
                                                 
58 Surveys of business clients suggest that 57.6 percent of program jobs would not have been created “but 
for” the MEED program (Rode 1988). These employers do not have a strong incentive to lie, as the program did not 
require that the jobs would not have been created without the subsidy. If the average wage subsidy is $12 per hour 
for 1,000 hours, the wage subsidy cost is $12,000 per subsidized worker. Assume that an additional 50 percent is 
added to the total cost for administrative costs, job developer costs, and job-support-coach costs, or $6,000 per 
subsidized worker. The cost per subsidized worker is then $18,000. Dividing by 57.6 percent gives a one-time job-
creation cost of $31,000.  
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Increasing Effective Land Supply for Development Can Boost Jobs while Redistributing 
Income to Nonlandowners 
 Local business costs can also be reduced, and local job growth induced, by increasing the 
effective supply of local land available for development. The efficiency of this approach depends 
upon whether the additional land supply can be made available in a cost-effective way, in which 
the business-cost reduction is considerably less than the social cost of making the additional land 
available for development.  
 Making additional land available for business development can have powerful effects on 
job creation. These effects may be underappreciated by many academic economists, but are well 
known by economic developers and others interested in attracting businesses to locate or expand 
in a local economy. Having more business sites that are high-quality and can quickly be 
developed has direct effects on job creation, by allowing businesses to more easily and more 
quickly expand to meet their economic needs. In off-the-record interviews of business executives 
about why they chose a particular city or state, the availability of a good site is often mentioned 
as a prime location factor.59 For example, one firm was asked by a researcher whether its 
location choice was due to the business-tax incentives provided by state and local governments. 
The CEO candidly said that these incentives were irrelevant. The firm’s location decision had 
been solely determined by the availability of a vacant factory suitable to its needs, which allowed 
the firm to quickly get into production at the new site.60  
 Business costs can also be lowered by making additional land supply available for 
housing development. Making additional land supply available for housing development lowers 
                                                 
59 Source: interviews by this report’s author with business executives.  
60 The importance of high-quality sites is also another reason why business tax incentive effects can 
sometimes be exaggerated. Even if the incented firm would not have located in this local area “but for” the 
incentive, the prime business site they chose might have attracted some other firm.  
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business costs by helping lower nominal wages, as additional land makes it easier to attract 
households to the local area.  These nominal wages will not only lower business labor costs, but 
they will also lead to lower prices of other local goods and services, which will further lower 
local business costs.  
 Effective local land supply can be increased through several mechanisms: regulatory 
changes, brownfield cleanup, redevelopment of distressed neighborhoods with a combination of 
tax incentives and extra services, and infrastructure investment in highways and other utilities. 
For regulatory changes, numerous studies have documented that local zoning regulations, 
building-permit regulations, and building codes can have powerful effects on local 
development—for example, by significantly affecting local housing costs (Glaeser and Gyourko 
2017; Hsieh and Moretti 2017; Saiz 2010; Saks 2008). For most of the United States, housing is 
priced at close to production costs. But about 15 percent of metropolitan areas have housing that 
is priced at 25 percent or more above estimated production costs. At the extreme, there are a few 
areas, such as the San Francisco area, in which housing is priced at close to three times 
production costs (Glaeser and Gyourko 2017).  
 In some cities, brownfields are a significant impediment to new development. Estimates 
suggest that in urban areas, vacant or abandoned land has an 85 percent probability of having 
some type of real or perceived environmental contamination from former uses (De Sousa 2013). 
The EPA estimates that the United States has more than 450,000 brownfields. Dealing with 
brownfields requires addressing legal liability issues, developing reasonable cleanup standards, 
and then actually paying for and doing the cleanup.  
 Many distressed neighborhoods are problematic for redevelopment because of 
dilapidated properties, deteriorated infrastructure and public services, high crime, and other 
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problems. Programs such as enterprise zones, federal Empowerment Zones, and tax increment 
financing have attempted to overcome these problems by providing some combination of tax 
breaks for investment or job creation or job hiring in the distressed neighborhood, combined with 
public services and infrastructure to address some of the neighborhood’s problems.  
 Finally, highways and other infrastructure alter the effective land supply in a local area. If 
a highway increases access of a site to workers, suppliers, and markets, it makes that land supply 
more cost-effective for new business development. If mass transit makes a site more accessible 
for workers, that site also is more effectively available for development. Other public utility 
infrastructure also can increase the effective supply of land.  
 How much do local costs have to go down to create one job? As discussed above, the 
research on effects of real wages suggests a cost per job-year of $50,000, whereas the literature 
on business tax cuts suggest a lower cost of about $18,000 per job-year. These would be costs 
that would apply to local cost reductions that are applied generally to all business, rather than 
being targeted at export-base businesses. Both logic and some empirical evidence suggest the 
lower cost of $18,000 per job-year is probably closer to the truth. Real-wage changes may have 
reduced effects because real-wage changes generate some offsetting productivity effects, which 
would not be true of changes in local nominal wages and other local costs. In addition, estimates 
from Saks (2008) of the effects of housing supply restrictions are roughly consistent with such a 
cost per job-year.61 
                                                 
61 Saks (2008, Table 4) estimates that local housing supply restrictions cause local demand shocks to have 
lower employment-rate effects. The ratio of the one-year employment growth effects of housing supply restrictions 
to the effects of housing supply restrictions on nominal wages is about (−0.06/0.07) = −0.86. The ratio of housing 
supply restriction effects on job growth to effects on housing prices is (−0.06/0.15) = −0.4. Other research suggests 
that the elasticity of overall local prices to housing prices is about 0.50. This 0.50 can be empirically estimated from 
the data in Aten (2006). Therefore, the ratio of the effects on job growth to imputed effects on overall prices would 
be [−0.06/(0.15 × 0.50)] = −0.8. This is quite similar to the imputed response to nominal wages. If we simply take 
the average of these two effects at −0.83, the implication is that a 1 percent increase in an area’s costs causes a one-
year reduction in jobs of −0.83 percent. If the economy adjusts at a 9 percent rate toward the long-run equilibrium, 
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 But the relevant issue is, “What are the social costs of bringing around such a local cost 
reduction?” If policies can be identified that lower local business costs by more than their social 
costs, then this cost per job-year can be considerably reduced.  
 In the case of zoning and housing permit restrictions on local housing supply, the 
contention of many economists is that many of these restrictions are economically inefficient, in 
that the new housing development that is prevented does not produce sufficient negative 
externalities to justify these restrictions. Some evidence supports this position (Turner, 
Haughwout, and van der Klaauw 2014). Therefore, relaxing at least some restrictions on housing 
supply would not have any efficiency cost, but rather would produce an efficiency gain.62 In 
other words, there is a “free lunch” for at least some reductions in housing supply regulations to 
promote local job growth: the local job growth can be achieved at no economic cost, or even at 
an economic gain, even before considering the social benefit from an additional job.  
 In addition, reducing housing supply restrictions may affect the income distribution 
progressively. Lower housing costs redistribute income from current owners to nonowners. This 
would have a net progressive effect on the income distribution, because housing owners are 
wealthier than nonowners.   
 Brownfield redevelopment also can create local jobs cost-effectively. Based on case 
study evidence, brownfield projects focused on job-creating projects have a cost per permanent 
job created of $13,000 (Paull 2008). If we assume such jobs depreciate at the rate of depreciation 
of manufacturing capital (7.39 percent), and if we use a 3 percent discount rate, then the net 
                                                 
the implied long-run elasticity is −0.83/0.09 = −9.2. If this cost elasticity is assumed to apply to overall value-added, 
and the result is entered into a gradual adjustment model, the long-run present value of reduced costs per present 
value of job-years is around $20,000. This calculation uses actual percentages and a 10 percent cut in value-added 
costs.   
62 Of course, there may be housing regulations or zoning rules that protect public safety (e.g. reducing fire 
risk) or promote neighborhood amenities by more than their costs (e.g., some protection of historic buildings). The 
point is that some current regulations and rules may be excessive.  
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present value of cost per net present value of job-years created will be around $1,300. If these 
projects are creating non-export-base jobs, much of this job creation would be offset by the loss 
of other local jobs, due to firms competing for the same local sales. But if the brownfield projects 
target manufacturing or other export-base jobs, then these brownfield jobs would have a 
multiplier effect. At a multiplier of 2, the net present value of cost per job-year is under $700.   
 For redevelopment of distressed neighborhoods, the evidence suggests that tax credits 
alone don’t work. Rather, services need to be added to address the neighborhood’s underlying 
problems. For example, numerous states since the 1980s have at various times designated 
distressed neighborhoods in cities, and some distressed rural areas, as enterprise zones. These 
enterprise zones typically have emphasized tax credits, either for investing in these distressed 
neighborhoods or for hiring or creating jobs in these distressed neighborhoods. The research on 
state enterprise zone programs is generally negative. Most studies find few effects of enterprise 
zones on designated zones (Elvery 2009; Greenbaum and Landers 2009; Lynch and Zax 2011; 
Neumark and Kolko 2010; Neumark and Simpson 2015; Peters and Fisher 2002). Apparently, 
these state and local tax credits alone were insufficient to turn about most distressed areas.  
 The federal Empowerment Zone program, created in 1993, appears to have had more 
positive results.63 The most rigorous study of the federal Empowerment Zone program suggests 
that the initial Empowerment Zone designation of zones in six cities did have significant effects 
on zone jobs, zone earnings of zone residents, and zone house values (Busso et al. 2013). This 
study is quasi-experimental:  it compared the census tracts in the six Empowerment Zones with 
matched similar tracts in other cities; these matched similar tracts in other cities either were 
rejected in the initial grant round or approved in later grant rounds. This matching with rejected 
                                                 
63 Or at least there are more positive results stemming from the initial version of Empowerment Zones, 
which included these large block grants for neighborhood services.  
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or later applicants should lead to the treatment tracts and matched tracts being similar in both 
observed and unobserved characteristics that might predict zone economic outcomes, which 
increases the odds that the estimated zone “effects” are truly due to the zone policy.  
 Why did Empowerment Zones have effects on designated areas, unlike most state 
enterprise zone programs? The most likely hypothesis is that unlike most state enterprise zone 
programs, the original Empowerment Zone program added a large dose of public services.  The 
federal Empowerment Zone program not only provided tax credits for zone employers that hired 
zone residents, but also provided each zone with block grants of $100 million. The value of this 
block grant was equivalent to more than $100 per zone resident per year for the 10-year period of 
the program. These block grants could be used for a wide variety of purposes to address zone 
problems. A sizable portion of these block grants were spent on business assistance or workforce 
development.64 The hypothesis is that if you want to help redevelop a distressed neighborhood, 
which by definition is a neighborhood with problems, cash incentives alone are insufficient—
services need to be provided to overcome the problems. To make land available for 
redevelopment requires overcoming the barriers to development.  
 The estimates in Busso et al. (2013) suggest that for a cost of about $1.3 billion (in 2015 
dollars), the Empowerment Zone program created about 78,000 jobs.65 The cost per job was then 
about $17,000. If we assume these jobs depreciate at 7.39 percent per year and we use 3 percent 
as a discount rate, the present value cost per present value of job-years is about $1,700.  The 
                                                 
64 Estimates reported in Busso et al. (2013), Table 2, from Hebert et al. (2001), suggest that the total block 
grant expenditure on access to capital, business assistance, and workforce development was about half the block 
grant spending. 
65 This calculation assumes that the Empowerment Zone program in these six cities had a cost in Year 2000 
prices of about $950 million—$400 million in block grants plus about $55 million per year in wage subsidies paid 
out over 10 years. The job creation figure of 78,000 is based on Busso et al.’s propensity-score-weighted estimates 
in column (3) of their Table 4, along with their Table 10 estimates that post-intervention employment in the z ones 
was about 403,000.  
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 53 
ultimate effect on area jobs depends upon whether these extra zone jobs are export-base jobs or 
not export-base jobs. If export-base jobs, these jobs will have a multiplier, lowering cost per job-
year to under $1,000. If these created zone jobs are not export-base jobs, then the cost per net 
area job-year will go up, because many of the jobs created in the zone neighborhoods will be 
offset by lost jobs elsewhere.  
 Another approach to promoting neighborhood development is tax increment financing 
(TIF) districts. Under TIF districts, any increases in the neighborhood from a base period in 
some type of tax revenue (usually property tax revenue) are used to finance bond issues that pay 
for public infrastructure in the targeted neighborhoods, or that are spent on some combination of 
special public services or cash incentives for business in the targeted neighborhood. That is, this 
“incremental” tax revenue is diverted from its normal recipients (e.g., the county government, 
the city, schools, other special-purpose governments), and is instead used to support some type 
of special services or programs in the targeted neighborhood. The available literature suggests 
that TIF districts make some difference to the targeted neighborhoods. However, the TIF 
neighborhood’s increase in jobs only increases total jobs in the overall local area if the TIF is 
adding industrial jobs; commercial jobs added in a TIF neighborhood tend to depress commercial 
job growth elsewhere in the local economy, outside the TIF neighborhood (Byrne 2010; Dye and 
Merriman 2003; Weber 2013).  
 Effective land supply can also be increased through infrastructure improvements. For 
example, consider the effects on land “quality” due to building new highways. These new 
highways increase the quality of land supply by providing additional sites with better access, 
both to output markets and to workers. This better access will result in additional business 
activity. 
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 How costly is it to create jobs through infrastructure improvements? The difficulty in 
estimating how infrastructure affects jobs is that infrastructure improvements will usually be 
determined “endogenously.”  The “endogeneity” is that highways and other infrastructure are 
built in response to increased local economic development. In other words, job creation may be 
causing infrastructure improvements. The resulting positive correlation between infrastructure 
improvements and job creation need not reflect a causal effect of infrastructure on jobs.   
 To identify how infrastructure affects jobs, we would need the following data: First, we 
need data on a real-world scenario in which infrastructure investments in some areas were 
determined independently of the area’s future job-creation potential. Second, we need to also 
have data on comparison areas with similar future job-creation potential that did not receive 
similar infrastructure investments.  Perhaps the best recent paper that has such data is the Kline 
and Moretti (2014b) paper on the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).  
 TVA stands out as perhaps the nation’s most expensive and extensive regional 
development program.66 Begun in 1933, TVA sought to spur the economic development of a 
large depressed region consisting ultimately of almost all of Tennessee, as well as significant 
parts of southwest Kentucky, northern and central Mississippi, northern Alabama, and smaller 
portions of northern Georgia, along with a few areas in Virginia and North Carolina. The 
economic strategy relied on building numerous dams to provide more reliable and less costly 
electricity to the region, along with public works expenditures on a navigation canal and 
highways, and also some services to boost public health and education and promote better 
farming and environmental practices. The bulk of the federal subsidies for TVA were delivered 
from 1940 to 1960, although considerable subsidies continued until about 2000. Total federal 
                                                 
66 The TVA descriptions and data are based on Kline and Moretti (2014b).  
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subsidies for TVA amounted to more than $25 billion (2015 dollars) over the entire 1940–2000 
period.   
 Kline and Moretti compare various economic outcomes, such as manufacturing job 
growth, in TVA-assisted counties to non-TVA-assisted counties. These comparisons control for 
a wide variety of baseline conditions in the TVA counties and the comparison counties. In 
addition, they consider the sensitivity of these results to various comparison groups. The most 
convincing comparisons are to counties that were located in seven other proposed regional 
authorities, modeled after TVA, that were seriously proposed in Congress and were almost 
enacted into law, both in 1937 and in 1945. These proposed authorities, located in the South, 
Midwest, and West, were similar to TVA, in that they were depressed and predominantly 
agricultural areas that were thought to be possible to revitalize through improving the local 
infrastructure.  
 Kline and Moretti find large effects of TVA on economic outcomes, either compared to 
all other U.S. counties, all other counties in the South, or all counties in these proposed 
authorities. In particular, TVA’s investments appear to have caused strong and persistent 
increases in manufacturing jobs. The results occur for all comparison groups, although they tend 
to be slightly smaller for the comparisons to the other proposed authorities.  In the results that 
compare TVA to the other proposed authorities, and that allow effects of TVA to vary over time, 
the cumulative percentage effect of TVA on manufacturing jobs in the TVA region by the year 
2000 was to increase manufacturing employment by 32 log percentage points. The implied effect 
on manufacturing jobs in the year 2000 would be to increase manufacturing jobs by 250,000 
jobs.  
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TVA’s manufacturing jobs impact seems quite persistent. Even after the largest subsidies 
stopped in 1960, the TVA effect on manufacturing employment seemed to continue to increase 
rather than to depreciate. Kline and Moretti interpret this lack of depreciation of the 
manufacturing jobs effect, even though the TVA infrastructure would depreciate, as evidence for 
some type of agglomeration economies. Once economic development policy has successfully 
boosted manufacturing jobs in a region, that boost may be self-sustaining if manufacturing 
productivity is boosted by the presence of other manufacturing firms. 
Suppose one assumes that the year 2000 percentage effect of TVA on manufacturing jobs 
in the TVA region continued at the same percentage level from 2000 to 2015. This seems a 
conservative assumption; Kline and Moretti estimate that even after TVA subsidies were 
drastically cut in 1960, TVA seemed to still be boosting manufacturing job growth, which 
implies that the percentage effect on manufacturing jobs would continue to increase over time. 
After 2015, suppose we assume that the job creation impact of TVA stayed the same over time.67 
With these calculations, the 2015 present value cost of TVA, divided by the present value of 
manufacturing job-years created from 1940 into the future, would be about $1,000.68 With a 
manufacturing multiplier of 2, the cost per total job-years created in the TVA region would be 
about $500 per job-year.   
The TVA experience suggests that even though infrastructure spending can be very 
expensive, it can in some cases be a relatively cost-effective way of creating manufacturing jobs.  
                                                 
67 Because manufacturing in the TVA region declined from 2000 to 2015, as it did in the United States, this 
implies that the total jobs impact of TVA declined from 250,000 in 2000 to 166,000 in 2015.  
68 In present-value 2015 dollars, total subsidies for TVA over the 1940-to-2000 period totaled $37.1 billion. 
Total 2015 present value of job-years created was 35.9 million. Note that 30.4 million of those job-years are from 
1940 to 2000, so this calculation is not very dependent on the assumption that the future number of jobs created will 
stay at 166,000 each year.   
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CAN MANUFACTURING-INTENSIVE COMMUNITIES SUCCEED? AND WHAT 
ROLE DO RESEARCH-SUPPORTED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES PLAY IN THEIR SUCCESS? 
Thus, research evidence suggests that providing high-quality customized services to 
business, along with human capital development and infrastructure improvements, can help cost-
effectively promote the economic development of manufacturing-intensive communities. But 
this research evidence is for the effects of particular services, and frequently only looks at the 
success of individual businesses. Is there evidence that these services actually help a 
manufacturing-intensive community’s overall success? For that matter, in the recent time period, 
since 2000, are there manufacturing-intensive communities that have survived the dramatic 
decline of U.S. manufacturing in this period, and actually succeeded economically? Is so, what is 
their secret? This section reviews the evidence of the success of some manufacturing-intensive 
communities in recent years, and assesses whether it seems to be associated with specific 
economic development services.  
Successful and Unsuccessful Manufacturing-Intensive Communities Since 2007 
 This subsection looks for signs of whether some manufacturing communities have been 
successful in recent years. The search for success focuses on manufacturing communities that are 
at least medium-sized. For small manufacturing-intensive communities, overall success or failure 
might be more likely due to one individual facility opening up/expanding or closing/contracting. 
What happens to one individual facility is more likely due to idiosyncratic features of that 
facility than to community-wide characteristics. Out of all the manufacturing-intensive 
communities in the United States, the search for success is limited to the 105 such commuting 
zones that as of 2010 had a population of 200,000 or greater.  
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 The “success” of a community can be defined in many ways. In this report, “success” is 
defined based on a commuting zone meeting both of two criteria: 1) the commuting zone’s 
growth rate of private employment had to exceed the national average from 2007 to 2015, and 2) 
the commuting zone’s growth rate of private employment had to be positive, on net, from 2000 
to 2015.69 The purpose was to identify manufacturing-intensive communities that were able to do 
better than the national average in the most recent period (2007–2015), even if they had done 
poorly in the 2000-to-2007 period, when the national manufacturing decline was most severe.  
However, the second criterion was added in order to focus on communities that were successful 
enough in the 2007-to-2015 period that they more than offset any losses suffered from 2000 to 
2007. Some experimentation with other ways of identifying successful manufacturing-intensive 
communities ended up coming up with similar lists.  
 Table 4 compares these 22 “successful” commuting zones, both with the 83 larger 
manufacturing-intensive commuting zones that were “unsuccessful” in that they did not meet 
both success criteria, and with the United States. As can be seen in the table, these larger CZs 
had over a third of total U.S. manufacturing employment in 2000, and over a third of the total 
decline in national manufacturing employment from 2000 to 2015, even though their overall 
employment share of the United States was only about 20 percent.  
 During the earlier 2000 to 2007 period, the “successful” 22 CZs already were doing 
better than the 83 “unsuccessful” CZs, although not better than the United States as a whole. 
                                                 
69 There is one issue in the County Business Patterns data that is used here. County Business Patterns has 
had a growing proportion of employment that is “statewide” and is not locatable in any particular commuting zone. 
This percentage grows from 0.45 percent in 2000 to 2.07 percent in 2007 and 3.45 percent in 2015. Much of this 
“statewide” employment appears to be in employment service agencies that list employment by their main office, as 
they are the employer of record, even though their employees may work elsewhere. This problem means that 
county-locatable jobs grew 1.40 percent from 2007 to 2015 in the United States, compared to the growth of all jobs 
of 2.82 percent. I used 1.40 percent as the cutoff to determine whether a CZ exceeded the national average growth 
from 2007 to 2015.   
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Table 4  Trends in 22 “Successful” CZs vs. 83 “Unsuccessful” CZs, out of all 105 Manufacturing-Intensive Larger CZs  (jobs measure in millions of 
jobs, or in percentage terms, as indicated) 
Panel A: Selected Comparisons to U.S. as a Whole 
 
“Successful” 22 CZs as % of U.S. total 
 












Manufacturing job decline as 
% of U.S, 2000–2015  
7.0 
 
“Unsuccessful” 83 CZs as % of U.S. total  
 








Manufacturing jobs as % of 
U.S., 2000 
27.1 
Manufacturing job decline as 
% of U.S., 2000–2015  
29.1 
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Panel B: Trends in Successful and Unsuccessful CZs 
 


















All private jobs 5.127  5.303 5.559 0.176 0.256 0.432 3.4 4.7 8.1 
Manufacturing jobs 1.111  0.851 0.773 (0.260) (0.078) (0.338) (26.5) (9.6) (35.9)
Manufacturing as % of 
private jobs 
21.7 16.0 13.9 
 
Manufacturing % change out 
of private jobs 
      (5.0) (1.4) (6.3) 
“Unsuccessful” 83 CZs 
 
All private jobs 19.197  18.726 18.211 (0.471) (0.515)  (0.986) (2.5) (2.8) (5.3)
Manufacturing jobs 4.456  3.471 3.040 (0.985) (0.431) (1.416) (24.8) (13.2) (37.8)
Manufacturing as % of 
private jobs 
23.2 18.5 16.7 
 
Manufacturing % change out 
of private jobs 
      (5.2) (2.3) (7.6) 
Panel C: U.S. as Whole (Table 2)  















All private jobs 113.888  120.599 124.048 6.712 3.449 10.161 5.7 2.8 8.5 
Manufacturing jobs 16.471  13.320 11.605 (3.151) (1.714) (4.865) (21.2) (13.8) (34.7)
Manufacturing as % of 
private jobs 
14.5 11.0 9.4 
Manufacturing % change out 
of private jobs 
     (2.7) (1.4) (4.1) 
NOTE: 105 manufacturing-intensive larger CZs analyzed here are those with 2000 manufacturing location quotient greater than 1.19 and 2010 population greater than 200,000. 
Successful CZs are those whose 2007-to-2015 job growth exceeded the national average and whose 2000 to 2015 job growth was positive.  All job data taken from Upjohn 
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During this period, the 22 CZs grew at 3.4 percent versus −2.5 percent for the 83 unsuccessful 
CZs and 5.7 percent for the United States as a whole. This relative success of the 22 CZs must 
have been due to better nonmanufacturing performance, as these 22 CZs experienced a similar 
negative shock to overall employment from declining manufacturing as did the 83 
“unsuccessful” CZs, at −5.0 percent for the 22 CZs versus −5.2 percent for the 83 CZs. The 22 
CZs were slightly less intensive in manufacturing as of 2000 than the 83 unsuccessful CZs, but 
they actually saw a larger percentage decline in their manufacturing base, and these offsetting 
effects led to a similar negative shock to manufacturing jobs as a percentage of total 
employment. Overall, the 22 CZs in the 2000-to-2007 period did surprisingly well relative to the 
U.S. economy. Their overall job growth performance was only 2.4 percentage points behind the 
U.S. economy (3.4 percent versus 5.7 percent), despite having a considerably more negative 
shock to manufacturing as a share of total jobs, a difference of −2.3 (–5 percent in these 22 CZs   
versus –2.7 percent in the United States as a whole.  With a multiplier of 2 or 3, one would have 
expected these 22 CZs to lag behind the U.S. economy by 5 to 7 percentage points, not 2.3 
percentage points. 
 In the latter period, 2007–2015, the 22 successful CZs did much better than the 83 
unsuccessful CZs and than the United States as a whole, as one would expect based on the 
criteria used to select successful CZs: 4.7 percent job growth for the 22 successful CZs, versus 
−2.8 percent for the 83 unsuccessful CZs, versus 2.8 percent for the United States. The 22 CZs 
gained 256,000 jobs, which is 7.4 percent of the total U.S. job gain over this period of 3.449 
million jobs, even though these 22 CZs are less than 5 percent of the total U.S. population. This 
2007–2015 success seems to be partly due to better manufacturing performance, and partly to 
better nonmanufacturing performance. For manufacturing, these 22 CZs on average still lost 
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manufacturing jobs from 2007 to 2015, but at a lesser rate than the 83 unsuccessful CZs or in the 
United States at a whole, at −9.6 percent in the 22 CZs, versus −13.2 percent in the 83 
unsuccessful CZs, versus −13.8 percent for the United States. As a result, these 22 CZs’ loss of 
manufacturing jobs, as a percentage of total employment, was only −1.4 percent, versus −2.3 
percent for the 83 unsuccessful CZs. This 0.9 percent better manufacturing performance, with a 
multiplier of 2 or 3 for manufacturing, would be enough to explain a 2-to-3 percentage point 
better overall employment performance for these 22 CZs, versus the 83 CZs. Therefore, 
manufacturing probably played some role in the success of some of these 22 CZs. 
 On the other hand, manufacturing is not the only explanation of success. The 22 
successful CZs overall showed employment growth from 2007 to 2015 of 4.7 percent, versus 
−2.8 percent for the 83 unsuccessful CZs, a gap of 7.6 percent. Manufacturing alone seems 
unlikely to explain the entire gap. 
A Closer Look at the 22 Successful CZs 
 Table 5 lists some characteristics that describe the growth performance of each of these 
22 “successful” manufacturing-intensive commuting zones. The commuting zones are sorted in 
order of 2010 population, from most to least populous.  
 The table shows that the “successful” communities are geographically diverse, although 
with some geographic clustering. In addition to some areas in the south, particularly in Georgia, 
North Carolina, Texas, and Arkansas, there also are successful areas in the upper Midwest—in 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Michigan—as well as success in such diverse areas as 
Burlington, Vermont; the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania; and Silicon Valley in California.  
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Silicon Valley 2.514  1.183 1.110 1.193 0.222 0.144 0.101  1.295 (6.3) 7.2 (42.4) (35.5)
Charlotte NC area 2.067  0.837 0.923 0.940 0.150 0.108 0.092  1.240 9.7 1.9 (32.7) (16.2)
Grand Rapids MI area 1.411  0.590 0.554 0.590 0.171 0.130 0.137  2.003 (6.2) 6.2 (26.9) 4.9 
Lehigh Valley PA 
area 
1.272  0.448  0.467  0.481  0.096 0.073 0.073  1.489 4.2  2.9  (27.2) (0.4) 
Augusta GA area 0.583  0.183 0.186 0.191 0.047 0.033 0.022  1.768 1.3 2.7 (33.8) (38.8)
Gainesville FL area 0.557  0.130 0.176 0.194 0.037 0.037 0.040  1.960 30.5 9.8 0.5 8.9 
Cedar Rapids/Iowa 
City IA area 
0.500  0.217  0.223  0.233  0.043 0.039 0.038  1.371 2.5  4.6  (9.3) (2.9) 
Fayetteville AR area 0.463  0.145 0.189 0.200 0.034 0.031 0.026  1.594 26.0 5.6 (8.0) (15.9)
Asheville NC area 0.458  0.157 0.164 0.166 0.031 0.021 0.020  1.380 4.4 1.7 (37.6) (5.2)
St. Cloud MN area 0.337  0.116 0.132 0.136 0.024 0.023 0.021  1.413 12.9 2.8 (2.4) (8.3)
York County SC area 0.336  0.083 0.090 0.096 0.023 0.016 0.014  1.882 8.6 6.0 (34.6) (12.4)
Burlington VT area 0.334  0.144 0.148 0.152 0.026 0.021 0.017  1.259 2.4 2.6 (20.4) (22.5)
Eau Claire WI area 0.327  0.120 0.128 0.132 0.028 0.026 0.027  1.594 6.1 3.5 (6.2) 4.5 
Clarksville TN area 0.322  0.072 0.078 0.079 0.021 0.017 0.016  1.990 8.4 1.8 (21.8) (0.6)
Longview TX area 0.314  0.093 0.109 0.115 0.019 0.018 0.018  1.405 15.3 5.1 (4.5) (1.0)
Waco TX area 0.306  0.103 0.103 0.113 0.019 0.015 0.016  1.275 (0.2) 8.9 (26.3) 7.3 
Coweta County GA 
area 
0.263  0.073  0.071  0.076  0.024 0.017 0.019  2.277 (3.6) 7.0  (36.0) 14.6  
Rochester MN area 0.253  0.112 0.128 0.130 0.021 0.017 0.013  1.276 12.9 1.8 (16.9) (28.5)
Waterloo/Cedar Falls 
IA area 
0.225  0.086  0.086  0.096  0.019 0.018 0.017  1.536 0.4  11.0  (5.2) (4.0) 
Jonesboro AR area 0.215  0.067 0.066 0.067 0.022 0.016 0.013  2.335 (1.0) 1.8 (36.6) (16.9)
La Crosse WI area 0.208  0.081 0.083 0.088 0.015 0.012 0.013  1.283 2.5 5.8 (19.9) 4.5 
Dubuque IA area 0.203  0.087 0.090 0.091 0.021 0.018 0.017  1.653 3.4 1.4 (15.8) (1.9)
NOTE: All population and jobs numbers are in millions. Percentage changes are percentage differences on base of the average of two time periods. All jobs figures come from 
Upjohn Institute's WholeData version of County Business Patterns.
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 Over the 2007–2015 period, some manufacturing-intensive communities succeeded 
despite weaknesses in manufacturing, whereas other areas succeeded in part because they did 
considerably better than the nation in manufacturing. Of the 22 commuting zones, seven actually 
had worst percentage job loss than the United Sates in manufacturing from 2007 to 2015, during 
which U.S. manufacturing jobs shrank by −13.8 percent. On the other hand, six of the 
commuting zones had positive growth in manufacturing jobs from 2007 to 2015. Another five of 
the communities had a performance in manufacturing jobs that was 10 percentage points better 
than that of the nation (that is, these five areas lost manufacturing jobs, but the loss was less 
negative than −3.8 percent, which is considerably better than the U.S. average job loss of 13.8 
percent). The remaining four areas lost manufacturing jobs and did somewhat better than the 
nation, but not 10 percentage points better.  
 There are four “successful” commuting zones whose 2010 population exceeded 1 
million: the Silicon Valley area; the Charlotte, North Carolina, area; the Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, area; and the Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, area. Of these four areas, two, Silicon 
Valley and Charlotte, had manufacturing job performance from 2007 to 2015 that was worse 
than the nation’s. The other two areas, Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley, had manufacturing 
job performance that was significantly better than the nation’s. We will now turn to exploring in 
a little more depth the job performance of these four larger “successful” commuting zones. How 
have Silicon Valley and Charlotte succeeded despite the poor performance of their local 
manufacturing industries? Is the above-average performance of manufacturing in Grand Rapids 
and the Lehigh Valley due to one standout manufacturing industry, or is their superior economic 
performance in manufacturing more broadly based? 
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A Shift-Share Analysis of Silicon Valley, Charlotte, Grand Rapids, and the Lehigh Valley 
 To get some insight into what might be causing the “success” of these four larger 
manufacturing-intensive areas—Silicon Valley, Charlotte, Grand Rapids, and the Lehigh 
Valley—this subsection does a shift-share analysis of their growth patterns from 2007 to 2015, 
and, for comparison, from 2000 to 2007. 
 Shift-share analysis divides the growth in an area’s jobs (or any other variable describing 
the size of the local economy) into two components: 1) a share component and 2) a shift 
component. The share component is the jobs growth that would occur if each industry in the 
local economy had simply grown at the national-average growth rate for that industry over that 
time period. The shift component is what remains, which is the jobs growth due to individual 
industries growing faster or slower than their national counterparts.  
 For an “export-base” industry, the share component’s prediction of growth will be 
realized if the industry has merely kept its market share of national demand for that industry. The 
shift component reflects the industry gaining or losing market share in the national market. This 
gain or loss of market share presumably reflects local variables that make this location a more or 
less cost-effective location, due to variables affecting either the prices of local inputs or the 
productivity of local inputs.  
 For a non-export-base industry, the shift-effect component will largely reflect what 
happens to local demand for an industry’s products. Therefore, retail trade industries will tend to 
have a positive “shift effect” if an area’s manufacturing industries are doing better. Local 
demand for retail goods will be higher because more workers will be employed in manufacturing 
industries and their suppliers.  
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 Export-base industries include almost all manufacturing industries. In addition, export-
base industries include some nonmanufacturing industries, such as software. But the analysis 
becomes more complicated because many nonmanufacturing industries in local economies are 
hard to definitively classify as export-base versus non-export-base. Many nonmanufacturing 
industries will be to some extent export-base and to some extent non-export-base, with the 
export-base proportion varying across local areas and over time. For example, “hospitals” to 
some extent serve local demand. But some hospitals with a strong reputation—think of the Mayo 
Clinic or the Cleveland Clinic—may clearly be an export-base industry to the nation, and even 
some less prestigious hospitals may attract patients from outside the local economy. Therefore, 
interpreting the “shift effect” for many nonmanufacturing industries can be an art, not a science. 
A positive shift effect in retail trade or food and drinking places is probably due to local trends in 
other industries. But a positive shift effect in hospitals or other health care, or in management or 
administration industries, can be due either to local demand or to local firms gaining share in the 
national market  
 The overall local shift effect can be divided in a straightforward way by industry. Each 
industry’s shift effect is simply the change in overall local jobs due to the difference between that 
industry’s percentage growth rate in the local area, and the national percentage growth in that 
industry, when applied to base-period jobs in the area in that industry. However, there are a 
variety of ways of dividing the share effect into individual industry components. As done in 
previous work (e.g., Bartik 1988), the share effect for each industry is calculated as the 
differential growth that occurs due both to the industry having different percentage growth in the 
nation than the all-industry average, and to the industry having an above- or below-average share 
of local jobs compared to the nation. The share effect for this industry asks essentially the 
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following question: how much higher or lower would the area’s growth have been if we reset the 
area’s base-period share of jobs in that industry at the national average, and reallocated the jobs 
in the industry to average-growth industries.  The share effect is positive if an area has an above-
average share in a high-growth industry or if the area has a below-average share in a low-growth 
industry. The share effect is negative if an area has an above-average share in a low-growth 
industry OR if the area has a below-average share in a high-growth industry. 
The below analysis does shift-share analysis with industries defined at the three-digit 
level, which implies 87 industries. Calculations are done for the overall shift and share effect for 
2000–2007 and 2007–2015. These together sum exactly to the local area’s differential growth 
from the nation in each time period.  
The analysis then looks at the sum of the share and shift effects over all manufacturing 
industries, and over all nonmanufacturing industries. Because these areas are relatively intense in 
manufacturing—that is, they have above-average shares—and because manufacturing has tended 
to be below average in growth, we expect that for all four areas, the sum of the share effect over 
all manufacturing industries will be negative in both time periods. Because manufacturing lost 
fewer jobs in the 2007–2015 period than in the 2000—2007 period, we expect for all four areas 
that the sum of the share effect over all manufacturing will become less negative from the former 
to the latter time period.     
 What contributes to high or low shift effects is harder to predict. For each area, we will 
see whether the shift effect shows some unusual changes from the period 2000–2007 to the 
period 2007–2015, in either manufacturing or nonmanufacturing. If it does so, we will look at 
which individual industries appear to be the largest contributors to the changes in the area’s shift 
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effect, either for manufacturing or nonmanufacturing, from the 2000–2007 period to the 2007–
2015 period.  
Silicon Valley 
 After experiencing much slower job growth than the nation from 2000 to 2007, Silicon 
Valley experienced much faster growth from 2007 to 2015.  
As Table 6 shows, after job growth of 12.0 percent slower than the nation from 2000 to 
2007, Silicon Valley grew 4.6 percent faster than the nation from 2007 to 2015.70 Comparing the 
two periods, Silicon Valley’s relative growth improved by 16.6 percentage points. The table then 
shows how in each time period, and in the difference between the two time periods, this 
differential growth is “explained” by share effects and shift effects in manufacturing versus  
 
Table 6  Shift-Share Analysis of Silicon Valley (%) 
 2000 to 2007 2007 to 2015 
Difference, latter period 
minus earlier period 
Differential growth compared to U.S. −12.03 4.59 16.62 
Share effect sum, manufacturing −2.26 −0.75 1.51 
Share effect sum, non-manufacturing −0.28 0.79 1.07 
Shift effect sum, manufacturing −1.78 −1.80 −0.02 
Shift effect sum, non-manufacturing −7.72 6.35 14.07 
NOTE: Based on Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns, analyzed at 3-digit NAICS industry level of 
detail. All numbers are contributions to overall percentage growth of area.  
 
 
nonmanufacturing industries. The sum of the share effect plus shift effect rows exactly equals the 
differential growth.   
 Of this huge swing, a little is due to manufacturing growing a bit better nationally—that 
is, the share effect for manufacturing becomes somewhat more positive. But the overwhelming 
                                                 
70 The growth numbers are slightly different from those implied by the previous table, because up until now 
percentage growth has been defined using arc elasticity—that is, the percentage change is calculated on a base of the 
initial and final level of jobs. The shift-share analysis uses percentage changes defined on a base of the initial level 
of jobs, which is more convenient computationally for shift-share.   
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part of this shift is due to the shift effect summed over nonmanufacturing industries turning from 
a large negative percentage to a large positive percentage.  The swing in the nonmanufacturing 
shift effect is from −7.7 percentage points to a positive 6.4 percentage points, a swing of 14.1 
percentage points.  In Silicon Valley, for some reason nonmanufacturing industries grew much 
more slowly than their national counterparts from 2000 to 2007, but then turned around and grew 
much faster than their national counterparts from 2007 to 2015.  
 What nonmanufacturing industries contributed the most to this turnaround? We can 
quantify the contribution of each of the 56 nonmanufacturing industries. If we focus attention on 
which industries contributed 0.70 percent or more to the 14.07 percent swing in the 
nonmanufacturing shift effect, we get eight industries. Table 7 presents these eight industries. 
For each industry, Table 7 shows their employment in the Silicon Valley in 2000, 2007, and 
2015, the contribution of the shift effect for this industry to the overall shift effect for each time 
period, and finally, in the rightmost column, the contribution of the industry to the overall swing 
in the nonmanufacturing shift industries from the earlier to the later period.  
 














Administrative and support services 104,247 62,242 68,297 −4.06 −0.06 4.00
Food services and drinking places 72,372 80,499 101,218 −0.48 0.73 1.21
Management of companies and 
enterprises 
53,111 51,395 61,172 −0.53 0.60 1.13 
Merchant wholesalers, durable goods  62,144 61,836 84,899 0.06 2.00 1.94
Publishing industries (except Internet) 35,529 29,657 37,946 −0.42 1.15 1.57
Specialty trade contractors 45,517 42,872 38,380 −0.64 0.22 0.86
Telecommunications 21,861 10,041 10,296 −0.67 0.18 0.86
Data processing, hosting, and related 
services 
4,028 3,402 14,402 −0.08 0.86 0.94 
NOTE: All job information comes from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Job numbers are 
actual job numbers. Shift effects show how that industry’s differential local performance contributes to total local job growth, 
and are stated in percentage terms. 
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 What this table suggests is that Silicon Valley’s improved performance in the latter 
period largely reflects the resurgence of tech industries after the dot-com bubble crashed in the 
early 2000s. Silicon Valley’s performance improved significantly in administrative and support 
services, management of companies and enterprises, merchant wholesalers for durable goods, 
publishing industries (which includes software), telecommunications, and data processing and 
hosting. All of these industries would be directly affected by how the tech industry fares in 
Silicon Valley. Specialty trade contractors would be favorably affected by increased building and 
construction activity in Silicon Valley, at least compared to the rest of the nation, where the 
housing bubble lowered such construction activity. And the nonexport industry “food services 
and drinking places” would be lifted up by a general rebound in the area economy.  
Charlotte Area 
 After experiencing considerably faster growth than the nation from 2000 to 2007, 
Charlotte’s growth from 2007–2015 slowed significantly. Charlotte’s overall 2007–2015 growth 
was actually somewhat lower than national growth. Charlotte is still considered in our list of 
“successful” areas because its growth from 2007 to 2015 was somewhat faster than overall 
growth of jobs that can be located in specific counties. 
 As shown in Table 8, Charlotte’s slower growth in 2007–2015 than in 2000–2007 was 
largely due to nonmanufacturing industries shifting their growth trends relative to their national 
counterparts.  
 From 2000 to 2007, Charlotte’s nonmanufacturing industries grew much faster than their 
national counterparts, overall directly contributing 8.0 percent to growth. This slowed in the next 
period to these industries growing at a more similar rate to their national counterparts. 
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Table 8  Shift-Share Analysis of Charlotte Commuting Zone (%)  
2000 to 2007 2007 to 2015 Difference, latter period 
minus earlier period 
Differential growth compared to U.S. 4.30 −0.98 −5.28 
Share effect sum, manufacturing −1.83 −0.31 1.52 
Share effect sum, nonmanufacturing −1.26 −1.60 −0.33 
Shift effect sum, manufacturing −0.65 −0.05 0.60 
Shift effect sum, nonmanufacturing 8.04 0.97 −7.07 
NOTE: Based on Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns, analyzed at three-digit NAICS industry 
level of detail. All number are contribution to overall area growth in percentage terms.  
 
 
Charlotte’s deteriorating nonmanufacturing performance was offset to some extent by 
manufacturing doing better nationally in the latter period. In the former period, manufacturing’s 
poor national performance in this manufacturing-intensive area directly subtracted 1.8 percent 
from Charlotte’s growth, and even more if one considers multiplier effects. In the latter period, 
Charlotte’s manufacturing intensity only directly subtracted 0.3 percent from growth due to poor 
national performance. This 1.5 percent swing in manufacturers’ national performance would be 
expected, with multiplier effects, to have contributed at least 3 percent to better Charlotte growth 
in the latter time period. This offset to some extent the deterioration in nonmanufacturing’s 
differential performance in Charlotte. 
In addition, there is no sign that Charlotte manufacturing did differentially better than its 
national counterpart industries in either time period. In both time periods, Charlotte 
manufacturing tended to do somewhat worse than its national counterparts, and by about the 
same amount in both time periods.  
To explore a bit what specific industries have contributed to these trends, Table 9 focuses 
on nonmanufacturing industries that in absolute value contributed at least 0.7 percent to the 
overall differential shift effect in nonmanufacturing during the period 2007–2015 compared to 
2000–2007. Table 9 shows these four industries. 
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Credit intermediation and related activities 26,678 57,821 48,013 3.17 −0.16 −3.33
Nursing and residential care facilities 15,260 22,432 21,992 0.54 −0.39 −0.93
Specialty trade contractors 36,054 42,481 30,930 0.30 −0.51 −0.80
Professional, scientific, and technical 
services 
45,090 50,246  59,624  −0.31% 0.59 0.90 
NOTE: All job information comes from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Job numbers are 
actual job numbers. Shift effects show how that industry’s differential local performance contributes to total local job growth, 
and are stated in percentage terms.  
 
 
 As this table shows, the big picture in Charlotte is that its growth from 2000 to 2007 was 
driven by growth in some finance-related industries and in health care. Health care growth then 
slowed down to some degree. But the bigger story is the dramatic slowdown in the growth of 
finance during the 2007–2015. Presumably this is related to the financial crisis in the U.S. 
economy.  On the other hand, the Charlotte area did show good growth in some scientific and 
technical services from 2007 to 2015, which added to its overall growth. In addition, because 
manufacturing losses in the nation were not as extreme, Charlotte’s above-average share of jobs 
in manufacturing industries was less of a problem.  
Grand Rapids, Michigan, Area 
 As Table 10 shows, the Grand Rapids, Michigan, area dramatically improved its 
performance relative to that of the nation in the 2007–2015 period, compared to 2000–2007. 
 
Table 10  Shift-Share Analysis of Grand Rapids Commuting Zone (%) 
 2000 to 2007 2007 to 2015 
Difference, 
latter period minus 
earlier period 
Differential growth compared to U.S. −11.86 3.52 15.38 
Share effect sum, manufacturing −3.02 −1.81 1.22 
Share effect sum, nonmanufacturing −1.03 −0.02 1.00 
Shift effect sum, manufacturing −1.94 4.05 5.99 
Shift effect sum, nonmanufacturing −5.87 1.30 7.17 
NOTE: Based on Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns, analyzed at three-digit NAICS industry 
level of detail. All numbers are contributions to overall area growth in percentage terms. 
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After growing in jobs more slowly than the nation by a margin of 11.9 percentage points from 
2000 to 2007, Grand Rapids grew more rapidly than the nation by 3.5 percentage points from 
2007 to 2015, a gain in relative performance of 15.4 percentage points. 
 Of this improvement in performance, much and perhaps all of it could be explained by 
the manufacturing sector. Because the nation’s manufacturing losses were less severe in the latter 
period than in the earlier period, Grand Rapids’ concentration of jobs in manufacturing was less 
of a problem in that latter period of 2007–2015.  In the former period, Grand Rapids’ 
manufacturing concentration, combined with the slow growth in manufacturing nationwide, 
directly reduced Grand Rapids’ overall growth by 3 percent, compared to a hypothetical world in 
which Grand Rapids had the average national share in all manufacturing industries. In the latter 
period, this growth drag from Grand Rapids’ above-average share in manufacturing, and slow 
national manufacturing growth, shrank to “only” 1.8 percentage points less growth in jobs. The 
result was that better national growth in manufacturing directly boosted Grand Rapids jobs by 
1.2 percent in the latter period relative to the former period.  
 Even more importantly, Grand Rapids’ relative performance in manufacturing industries, 
compared to its national counterparts, greatly improved in the 2007–2015 period over the earlier 
2000–2007 period. In the former period, manufacturing industries in Grand Rapids grew more 
slowly than their national counterparts; this differential local growth directly reduced Grand 
Rapids’ overall job growth by 1.9 percentage points relative to that of the nation. In the latter 
period, Grand Rapids’ manufacturing industries tended to gain market share and grow faster than 
their national counterparts; this differential manufacturing industry growth directly boosted 
Grand Rapids’ overall job growth relative to the nation’s by 4.1 percentage points. The overall 
swing in the market shares of Grand Rapids’ manufacturing industries from the 2000–2007 
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period to the 2007–2015 period directly caused Grand Rapids’ relative growth to pick up by 6.0 
percent in 2007–2015 over that of 2000–2007.  
 With even a modest multiplier, the less severe losses in manufacturing in 2007–2015, and 
the gain in market shares of Grand Rapids’ manufacturers, would be able to explain the overall 
swing in Grand Rapids’ relative performance over time. Together, these sum to about 7.2 percent 
(1.2 percent due to better national growth, 6.0 percent due to gains in Grand Rapids’ market 
share in manufacturing). A multiplier of a little more than 2 would “explain” why Grand Rapids’ 
relative growth performance improved by 15.4 percent in 2007–2015 compared to 2000–2007.  
 Let’s look at some industry detail, both to see which manufacturing industries improved 
their performance in manufacturing, and to check on what is going on in specific 
nonmanufacturing industries. Table 11 looks at the specific manufacturing industries that 
contributed at least 0.7 percent to the overall improvement in Grand Rapids’ job performance.  
 
Table 11  Manufacturing Industries in Grand Rapids that Made Especially Large Contributions to Changing 

















Chemical manufacturing 11,179  6,114 8,132 −0.66 0.41 1.07
Fabricated metal product 
manufacturing 
19,693  15,543  17,691  −0.29 0.60 0.89 
Food manufacturing 11,374  10,234 14,182 −0.16 0.65 0.81
Furniture and related product 
manufacturing 
24,901  14,299  12,876  −0.96 0.55 1.50 
NOTE: All job information comes from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Job numbers are 
actual job numbers. Shift effects show how that industry’s differential local performance contributes to total local job growth, and 
are stated as contributions to overall area growth in percentage terms. 
 
 
 The key point from Table 11 is that the improvement in Grand Rapids’ manufacturing 
market share is not due to just one industry, but rather is broad-based. In particular, Grand 
Rapids’ improvement in manufacturing is not attributable solely to the performance of one of its 
specialized industries, the furniture industry, in which Grand Rapids had a location quotient of 
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7.39 in 2000 and 5.96 in 2007. Grand Rapids did dramatically improve its relative performance 
in the furniture industry, but this mainly served to lower the job losses in this industry given the 
industry’s overall national job losses. But Grand Rapids also dramatically gained market share in 
many other manufacturing industries. The gain in market share was most dramatic in industries 
as diverse as chemical manufacturing, fabricated metal product manufacturing, and food 
manufacturing.  
Another way to put it is that from 2007 to 2015, Grand Rapids gained over 8,000 jobs in 
the three manufacturing industries of chemical manufacturing, fabricated metal products, and 
food manufacturing. With a multiplier of 2 or 3, this would add 16,000 to 24,000 jobs to Grand 
Rapids over this time period, compared to an overall growth of jobs in Grand Rapids over this 
period of 35,000 jobs.   
What if we look at individual nonmanufacturing industries? Do relative trends in these 
industries seem plausibly driven by manufacturing trends? Table 12 shows the nonmanufacturing 
industries in Grand Rapids that had a gain in market share in 2007–2015, relative to 2000–2007, 
sufficient to contribute 0.7 percent or more to overall job growth.  
 Of these five nonmanufacturing industries, increases in market share in four of them 
seem plausibly driven by manufacturing trends: 1) management of companies, 2) wholesalers of 
durables, 3) motor vehicle dealers, and 4) specialty trade contractors. Increased overall demand 
will increase motor vehicle sales and building activity. Expansion of manufacturing may increase 
management activity and wholesaling of durable goods. However, trends in the ambulatory 
health care industry may reflect Grand Rapids gaining market share within a broader regional 
market.  
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Table 12  Nonmanufacturing Industries in Grand Rapids That Made Especially Large Contributions to 

















Ambulatory health care services 19,366  22,874  30,557  −0.30 0.54 0.85 
Management of companies and 
enterprises 
13,168  14,103  19,119  −0.03 0.75 0.79 
Merchant wholesalers, durable goods  19,671  16,404  21,332  −0.50 0.85 1.35 
Motor vehicle and parts dealers  9,516  6,936  9,006  −0.48 0.39 0.87 
Specialty trade contractors 20,565  15,597  16,084  −1.22 0.54 1.77 
NOTE: All job information comes from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Job numbers are 
actual job numbers. Shift effects show how that industry’s differential local performance contributes to total local job growth, 
and are stated as contributions to overall area growth in percentage terms.  
 
 
Lehigh Valley Area 
 Table 13 summarizes the overall shift-share analysis of the Lehigh Valley area. In the 
2007–2015 period, relative to the 2000–2007 period, the Lehigh Valley area significantly 
improved its performance relative to that of the United States. In the earlier period, Lehigh 
Valley grew about 1.6 percentage points less than the United States. In the latter period, despite 
the area’s concentration in manufacturing, the Lehigh Valley area grew slightly faster than the 
United States.  
 
Table 13  Shift-Share Analysis of Lehigh Valley Commuting Zone (%)  
2000 to 2007 2007 to 2015 
Difference, latter 
period minus earlier 
period 
Differential growth compared to U.S. −1.57 0.12 1.69 
Share effect sum, manufacturing −2.57 −0.96 1.60 
Share effect sum, nonmanufacturing 0.22 0.55 0.33 
Shift effect sum, manufacturing −0.24 2.19 2.43 
Shift effect sum, nonmanufacturing 1.02 −1.65 −2.67 
NOTE: Based on Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns, analyzed at three-digit NAICS industry 
level of detail. All numbers are contributions to overall area growth in percentage terms. 
 
 
 This greater relative performance seems to be more than explained by the Lehigh Valley 
improving its performance in manufacturing. In contrast, the Lehigh Valley seems to be held 
back by problems in nonmanufacturing. Due to manufacturing not losing as many jobs nationally 
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in the latter period, the manufacturing-intensive Lehigh Valley area did better simply because of 
national trends. The Lehigh Valley’s manufacturing intensity, and the poor national 
manufacturing performance, directly cost the Lehigh Valley a loss of 2.6 percent in overall 
employment in the 2000-to-2007 period. In the latter period, with manufacturing job losses 
somewhat less, this negative job effect shrank to −1.0 percent, an improvement of 1.6 percent.  
 Furthermore, the Lehigh Valley seemed to gain much more market share in 
manufacturing in the 2007–2015 period. In the earlier 2000–2007 period, Lehigh Valley 
manufacturers slightly lost market share relative to their national counterparts, with this loss 
directly contributing −0.2 percent to slower growth. In the latter period, Lehigh Valley 
manufacturers did better than their national counterparts, with this gain in market share directly 
contributing 2.2 percent to overall Lehigh Valley growth. This swing increased Lehigh Valley’s 
relative job performance by 2.4 percent, comparing 2007–2015 with 2000–2007 (2.2 percent 
minus −0.2 percent).  
 Overall, the manufacturing trends in Lehigh Valley would have predicted an even greater 
economic improvement than what in fact happened. Together, the lower national manufacturing 
job losses, and Lehigh Valley’s gain of market share, would have directly predicted a 4.0 percent 
increase in jobs from manufacturing alone (1.6 percent from the manufacturing share effect, 2.4 
percent from the greater manufacturing shift effect). With a multiplier effect of even 2, one 
would have expected Lehigh Valley’s job performance to have improved by 8 percentage points 
relative to the nation’s, rather than the actual observed improvement of 1.7 percent.  
 What happened? It appears that nonmanufacturing performance deteriorated in the 
Lehigh Valley. Nonmanufacturing gained market share in the earlier period, then lost market 
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share in the latter period. This shift in nonmanufacturing performance directly subtracted 2.7 
percent from local growth, with possible multiplier effects.  
 Let’s look in more detail at specific industries in the Lehigh Valley, first in 
manufacturing, and then in nonmanufacturing. Table 14 looks at four industries that directly 
contributed 0.3 percent or more to the improvement in Lehigh Valley manufacturing 
performance. As Table 14 shows, after losing considerable jobs in these four industries from 
2000 to 2007, the Lehigh Valley gained jobs in these industries from 2007 to 2015, due to 
gaining market share. Overall, after losing more than 10,000 jobs in these four industries from 
2000 to 2007, the area gained more than 2,500 jobs in these four industries from 2007 to 2015.  
 
Table 14  Manufacturing Industries in the Lehigh Valley That Made Especially Large Contributions to 

















Computer and electronic product mfg. 7,037 1,487 1,777 −0.72 0.14 0.86
Fabricated metal Product Mfg 9,313 7,387 7,631 −0.17 0.17 0.35
Food Mfg 8,191 6,663 7,558 −0.31 0.15 0.45
Transportation equipment mfg 5,502 3,943 5,189 −0.15 0.32 0.47
NOTE: All job information comes from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Job numbers are 
actual job numbers. Shift effects show how that industry’s differential local performance contributes to total local job growth, and 
are stated as contributions to overall area growth in percentage terms. 
 
 
 What happened in nonmanufacturing? Table 15 highlights five nonmanufacturing 
industries that contributed −0.4 percent or more to the deterioration in Lehigh Valley’s market 
share in nonmanufacturing in 2007–2015, compared to 2000–2007. 
 A major role appears to be played by trends in a finance-related industry, credit 
intermediation. After greatly expanding in the Lehigh Valley from 2000 to 2007, this industry 
lost many local jobs from 2007 to 2015. This plausibly had some relationship to the U.S. 
financial crisis. In addition, the Lehigh Valley lost jobs in telecommunications. It also seems 
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Table 15  Nonmanufacturing Industries in Lehigh Valley That Made Especially Large Contributions to 

















Admin. and support services 28,730 27,778 24,827 −0.59 −1.28 −0.69
Credit intermediation and related act. 7,869 11,669 7,948 0.55 −0.44 −0.98
Hospitals 18,929 25,531 29,820 1.08 0.68 −0.40
Nursing and residential care facilities 13,372 16,493 17,424 0.18 −0.29 −0.47
Telecommunications 3,612 4,652 3,078 0.37 −0.16 −0.53
NOTE: All job information comes from Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of County Business Patterns. Job numbers are 
actual job numbers. Shift effects show how that industry’s differential local performance contributes to total local job growth, 
and are stated as contributions to overall area growth in percentage terms. 
 
 
there was a loss of some administrative and support services, perhaps due to losing some 
regional headquarters activities. Finally, after gaining some market share in health-related 
industries, this trend slowed in the latter period.  
A Regression Analysis of What Explains 2007–2015 Job Growth “Success” in These 105 
Larger Manufacturing-Intensive Commuting Zones 
 This subsection returns to a broader analysis of what determined job growth from 2007 to 
2015 in these 105 larger manufacturing-intensive commuting zones. Is there any sign that 
customized business services have played any role in relative trends across these local 
economies? Have worker skills played a role? What about worker wages? Business taxes and 
business incentives? 
 To explore this issue, this subsection reports results from a regression analysis with data 
on these 105 commuting zones. Specifically, the regression has as a dependent variable the 
2007–2015 growth of private sector jobs. The regression attempts to predict private job growth 
with a variety of possible local determinants, including variables related to local economic 
development policy and local human capital policy.   
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 This regression is at least descriptive of what is correlated with recent trends in local job 
growth for manufacturing-intensive communities. Many of the right-hand-side variables are 
potentially “endogenous,” in that unobserved variables driving growth could be correlated with 
these variables. The regression does not purport to rely on any good “quasi-experimental” 
evidence or “natural experiment” evidence, in which some exogenous change in some variable is 
driving the right-hand variables and providing strong, robust evidence of causal impacts.  
 However, the regression evidence is suggestive. The regression includes controls for 
many possible determinants of 2007–2015 growth that could bias results. In particular, the 
regression controls for past job growth, from 2000 to 2007, which controls for at least some 
unobservable variables that could drive future job growth from 2007 to 2015, and which might 
be correlated with local real wages and business taxes and other right-hand-side variables. The 
regression also includes a “share effect” control, which measures what growth would occur if 
each local industry in 2007 grew at the rate of its national counterpart from 2007 to 2015. This 
controls for various industry-mix contributions to growth, which might be correlated with the 
other right-hand variables. As an additional industry-mix control, the regression also controls for 
the 2007 share of employment in manufacturing. The regression includes dummy variables 
controlling for four geographic regions (East, Midwest, South, West), and this serves to control 
for some unobservable variables related to climate and history that might both drive 2007-to-
2015 growth and be correlated with other right-hand side variables. Finally, the regression 
controls for the size of the local area, in total employment as of 2007, which controls for the 
possibility that job growth trends might favor large versus small commuting zones and be 
correlated with other right-hand-side variables. Because of these controls, the “effects” of the 
various right-hand-side variables are effects holding constant some potentially very important 
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variables that might drive 2007-to-2015 growth trends and be correlated with the right-hand-side 
variables, thus biasing a causal implication of the results. While the regression estimates might 
still be biased by other unobserved determinants of growth, the regression estimates are more 
likely to reveal some causal influences than regressions that included fewer potentially important 
controls.  
 The relevant policy-related variables that are included are as follows: 
 Real worker wages in 2007, controlling for the education and age mix of the local workforce 
 Local prices in 2007 
 Overall business taxes on export-base industries, as a percentage of export-based value-
added, averaged over the 2007–2015 period 
 Overall business tax incentives for export-base industries, as a percentage of export-based 
value-added, averaged over the 2007–2015 period 
 Customized job training spending on export-base industries, as a percentage of export-base 
value-added, average over the 2007–2015 period  
 Job creation reported in survey of clients of manufacturing extension services, over the 
2007—2015 period; 
 The percentage of college-educated in the commuting zone’s population, as of 2007.  
The dependent variable is the change from 2007 to 2015 in the logarithm of total 
commuting zone private-sector employment (that is, it is the change in private employment in 
log percentage terms). The other right-hand-side variables are generally also specified in 
logarithmic terms, unless they are already implicitly measured in proportional terms, in which 
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case the variables are kept in proportional terms. Table 16 provides a list of the variables 
included in the regression, with a brief definition and some descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 16  Descriptions and Statistics for Variables in Regression of Determinants of 2007–2015 Job Growth 
in 105 Larger, Manufacturing-Intensive Commuting Zones 
Variable in regression Mean 
Standard 









Change in ln of private jobs, 
2007–2015 
−0.0192 0.0502 −0.1386 0.1099 −0.1052 −0.0503 −0.0157 0.0134 0.0618 
ln(hourly real wage), adjusted for 
gender/age/education mix 
2.9350 0.0464 2.7763 3.0271 2.8545 2.9067 2.9456 2.9616 3.0008 
ln(local prices) −0.1344 0.0707 −0.2532 0.2492 −0.2231 −0.1773 −0.1423 −0.1099 −0.0164
Business taxes/value-added 0.0432 0.0164 0.0000 0.0637 0.0000 0.0397 0.0445 0.0563 0.0594
 Tax incentives/value-added 0.0141 0.0104 0.0000 0.0417 0.0000 0.0052 0.0111 0.0197 0.0295
Customized job training 
spending/value-added 
0.0005 0.0008 0.0000 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0016 
Indicator for missing tax and 
incentive data 
0.0571 0.2332 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Share effect prediction of growth 
in ln(private jobs) 
0.0137 0.0173 −0.0595 0.0562 −0.0108 0.0074 0.0142 0.0238 0.0346 
log job growth predicted due to 
claimed MEP jobs created 
0.0096 0.0140 0.0001 0.1109 0.0009 0.0030 0.0051 0.0118 0.0283 
Change in ln of private jobs, 
2000–2007 
0.0031 0.0765 −0.1747 0.3076 −0.1010 −0.0514 0.0021 0.0349 0.1295 
ln of mfg to private job ratio, 
2007 
−1.6444 0.2601 −2.1459 −0.9750 −2.0173 −1.8520 −1.6256 −1.4645 −1.1925 
ln(private jobs), 2007 11.9975 0.7515 10.9391 14.3700 11.1125 11.4095 11.8868 12.3969 13.5017
Proportion of ages 25–64 with 
college degree or more, 2007 
0.2256 0.0588 0.1085 0.3979 0.1377 0.1834 0.2233 0.2599 0.3290 
NOTE: All data is for sample of 105 manufacturing-intensive commuting zones with population exceeding 200,000 in 2010. Jobs 
data is from Upjohn Institute WholeData database’s version of County Business Patterns data.  Dependent variable is the change in 
the natural logarithm of total private jobs in each of these 105 CZs, 2007–2015.  Hourly real wage, local prices, and proportion with a 




The resulting regression estimates are presented in Table 17. The estimates are first 
described qualitatively. The discussion then moves on to interpreting some of the magnitudes of 
the coefficient estimates for the right-hand-side variables that are most policy relevant. These 
quantitative magnitudes are relevant to helping determine what policies can cost-effectively help 
manufacturing-intensive communities.  
Qualitatively, the results provide little support for some traditional ideas about how to 
help distressed communities. In particular, private job growth in these commuting zones during  
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Table 17  Regression of Commuting Zone Job Growth, 2007–2015, on Commuting Zone Characteristics, for 
105 Manufacturing-Intensive Larger Commuting Zones 
Dependent variable:  Change in ln(private jobs) from 2007 to 2015 
Right-hand-side variable Coefficient [standard error in brackets] 
 
ln(local prices) 0.179* 
[0.106] 
ln(local real wages), controlling for age/gender/education 0.0182 
[0.106] 
Business taxes/value-added 1.263* 
[0.686] 
Tax incentives/value-added −0.934 
[0.662] 
Customized job training/value-added 11.73* 
[6.440] 
Indicator for missing tax/incentive data 0.0201 
[0.0322] 
Share effect prediction of growth in ln(private jobs) 0.0360 
[0.392] 




Proportion of ages 25–64 with college degree or more 0.372*** 
[0.125] 
ln of manufacturing to private job ratio, 2007 0.00436 
[0.0305] 
ln(private jobs), 2007 −0.00959 
[0.00766] 
Change in ln of private jobs, 2000 to 2007 0.139** 
[0.0665] 
Dummy variable for Northeast region −0.0109 
[0.0131] 
Dummy variable for Midwest region 0.00314 
[0.0113] 
Dummy variable for West region −0.0433 
[0.0294] 
Constant term −0.0664 
[0.299] 
Observations 105 
Adjusted R-squared 0.319 
NOTE: Variables described in prior table (Table 16).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. Asterisks indicate 
statistically significantly different coefficient from zero at various two-sided confidence intervals, as follows: * p < 0.1; ** p < 
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this time period does not appear to be affected in any large and expected way by making wages, 
local costs, business taxes, or business tax incentives more competitive. The real wage 
coefficient has the wrong sign, although it is statistically insignificantly different from zero.  
 Local prices also have the wrong sign, at least if one expected them to have a negative 
effect as a measure of local costs, and are marginally statistically significantly greater than zero. 
Business taxes on export-base industries have the wrong sign, in that higher business taxes are 
correlated with higher job growth, and lower business taxes with lower job growth; this 
unexpected business tax effect is marginally statistically significant. Business tax incentives also 
have the “wrong” sign, in that higher business tax incentives are correlated with subsequent  
lower job growth; however, this tax incentive effect is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
On the other hand, variables associated with customized business services and local job 
skills tend to have the right sign and are sometimes statistically significant. Higher customized 
job-training spending on export-base industries (mostly manufacturing industries in most states) 
has a positive effect on job growth, and this effect is marginally statistically significant. The 
claimed job creation due to manufacturing extension services is positively related to growth, and 
this effect is statistically significant. Finally, the percentage of the local population with a college 
degree has a positive effect in these manufacturing-intensive areas, and this effect is statistically 
significant.  
But what is implied by these coefficient estimates’ quantitative magnitude? For each 
policy variable, the coefficient estimate will be analyzed to see what it implies for how that 
policy variable might affect growth, how that effect compares with what might be expected 
based on prior research, and what it means for the costs of different policies per job created.  
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Real wages  
Given the imprecision with which the real wage coefficient is estimated, the 95 percent 
confidence interval for this coefficient estimate extends to a real wage elasticity of response of 
employment of −0.2 [= 0.0182 −1.987 × 0.106], where 1.987 is the appropriate t-statistic to form 
a 95 percent confidence interval for a t-distribution with 89 degrees of freedom, which is the case 
for this regression).  
This −0.2 is obviously less negative than the long-run real wage elasticity from the 
research literature of −1.5. However, this −1.5 real wage elasticity applies in the long run for 
export-base employment and multiplier effects of export-base employment that might be 
sensitive to local costs. Non-export-base local employment should not directly vary with local 
costs.  
If the economy adjusts by about 9 percent per year to its long-run equilibrium, the 
adjustment over the 8 years from 2007 to 2015 would be 47 percent of the long-run change (47 
percent = 0.91 to the eighth power).  Based on Bartik (2017a), export-base employment is 33.7 
percent of total local employment. With a multiplier of 2, 67.4 percent of local jobs would 
directly or indirectly respond to local costs. A 1.5 long-run real-wage elasticity for 67.4 percent 
of local employment would correspond to an eight-year elasticity for total local employment of 
−0.5 (= −1.5 × 47 percent × 67.4 percent).  
Therefore, the real-wage elasticity estimated here is estimated sufficiently precisely to 
rule out elasticities that are more negative than one-half the research consensus. At least for these 
manufacturing-intensive communities in this recent time period, lower real wages seem less 
important in driving job growth than is implied by the research literature.  
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It then follows that based on these estimates, the costs of achieving job growth through 
lower real wages would be even higher than is implied by the research literature elasticity of 
−1.5.  There is little support in these estimates for lowering real wages as a strategy for helping 
manufacturing communities.  
The real-wage coefficient could of course be biased. Even controlling for past growth, 
region, and industry-mix-predicted future growth, it is possible that expected future job growth 
could lead to higher real wages today, which would bias the estimated real-wage coefficient 
toward zero.  
Local prices  
Given the standard error in the coefficient on the local prices’ variable, the 95 percent 
confidence interval at its most negative extends to a local price elasticity of jobs of −0.03 (= 
0.179 – 1.987 × 0.106).  
If local prices only affect local job growth by affecting local costs, we would expect a far 
more negative elasticity. If local costs have a similar effect per dollar to state and local business 
taxes, we would expect a long-run elasticity of −10, at least for the export-base and related jobs 
that are locally cost-sensitive. The research literature’s consensus on the long-run elasticity of 
local business activity with respect to state and local business taxes, holding public services 
constant, is −0.5. State and local business taxes have typically averaged about 5 percent of 
business value-added, which is one measure of costs. The implied elasticity with respect to costs 
would be −0.5 / 5 percent = −10.  
Given that this is an eight-year elasticity, the expected elasticity would be 47 percent of 
the long-run elasticity. Furthermore, if only export-base jobs and their multiplier jobs were 
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negatively affected by local costs, then the elasticity of total jobs would be 67.4 percent of the 
elasticity for export-base-related jobs. Therefore, the expected elasticity with respect to costs for 
total jobs after eight years might be −10 × 47 percent × 67.4 percent = −3.2.  
Because of this, the empirical estimates in this regression for effects of local prices on 
jobs can only be reconciled with prior research on the effects of business costs by assuming that 
local prices have some positive non-cost-related effects on local jobs. The local price variable is 
constructed from measures of local housing prices. It is certainly possible that local housing 
prices might have household wealth effects that lead to local prices being correlated with local 
consumption demand (Howard 2017). 
These housing price effects on local consumption demand need not imply that increases 
in land available for local industrial use wouldn’t positively affect local job growth. However, it 
does raise some doubt as to whether relaxing housing supply constraints, thus lowering housing 
prices, will always and everywhere be a net boost to local job growth. A complete analysis of 
how housing supply regulations affect growth must consider wealth effects on local consumption 
demand.  
Alternatively, perhaps local housing prices are in part endogenously determined by 
expectations or predictors of future job growth, even controlling for the other growth 
determinants in the regression. In that case, any causal effects of higher local prices discouraging 
future job growth might be biased in this regression because of expected future growth 
increasing housing prices.  
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Business tax elasticity  
With the estimated standard error, the 95 percent confidence interval for the business tax 
variable’s effect extends to −0.1. This is far less negative than would be expected. When 
business taxes are measured as a proportion of value-added, the research consensus implies a 
long-run jobs elasticity with respect to this business tax variable, holding public services 
constant, of −10. If only export-base-related jobs respond to this business tax variable, and if we 
consider an eight-year effect rather than a long-run effect, the expected jobs effect of this 
business tax variable is reduced to −3.2 (= −10 × 67.4 percent × 47 percent).  
Why are the business tax effects so small in these estimates? One possibility is that the 
business tax effects estimated here include effects due to lower public spending and lower public 
services, as these public service variables are not included in the regression. If this explanation is 
valid, then the implication is that the lower public services associated with lower business taxes 
offset most of any benefits of lower business taxes for job creation.  
Alternatively, the business tax variable’s true effects might be estimated with bias 
because business taxes are endogenously chosen by state and local policymakers. If 
policymakers tend to choose lower business taxes when they expect lower future job growth, 
then this will tend to bias estimated business taxes toward zero, or even cause lower business 
taxes to actually be associated with lower future growth. This depends upon the reverse 
causation, from expected future growth to lower business taxes today, being stronger than the 
direct causation, from lower business taxes to future job growth, even holding constant other 
determinants of future growth.  
If the −0.1 business tax effect is valid, it implies that the cost per job created from 
business tax reductions is much greater than discussed above, by a factor of about 30. And if the 
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point estimate is correct, lower business taxes, once one allows for public service effects, tend to 
reduce future local job growth.  
Tax incentive elasticity  
With the estimated standard error, the maximum positive value for the incentive variable 
coefficient encompassed by the 95 percent confidence interval is 0.4. For similar reasons as 
discussed above, for these effects to be consistent with the effects of business taxes in the 
literature, the estimated effect of this incentive variable would have to be 3.2.  
As with the business tax variable, there seem to be two competing hypotheses for why the 
incentive estimate is not more positive. The first is that incentives may have some negative 
effects on public spending on public services, which could offset most or all of any positive 
effects of incentives on job growth.  
The competing hypothesis is that the incentive estimated effect is biased because of 
endogeneity. Even holding constant various predictors of 2007–2015 job growth, it is possible 
that policymakers may choose higher incentives when for unobserved reasons they expect 2007–
2015 job growth to be lower.  
If the point estimate is true, a policy of increasing incentives actually reduces job growth. 
And even if we go to the most positive effects of incentives on job growth that is consistent with 
these estimates, we would get a cost-per-job-created of incentives of around 10 times what we 
would expect from the research literature.  
Customized job training  
If customized job training had effects similar per dollar to overall business taxes, we 
would expect the coefficient on the customized job training variable to be 3.2. If customized job 
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training has effects on job creation that are five times as great as tax variables of the same costs, 
as was argued in a previous section of this report, we would expect a coefficient on the 
customized job training variable of 15.8.  
The actual coefficient estimate is 11.7. This estimate is about 3.7 times what would be 
expected based on the tax literature. However, the 95 percent confidence interval for this 
coefficient estimate extends up to 24.5. Therefore, we cannot reject that customized job training 
might have effects per dollar of five times the average effect in the research literature of business 
tax variables. Of course, the 95 percent confidence interval also encompasses zero, so at that 
confidence level we cannot reject the hypothesis that customized job training is irrelevant to job 
growth. The customized job training coefficient is marginally significantly different from zero if 
we instead use a 90 percent confidence interval.  
Overall, the point estimate implies slightly higher costs per job for customized job 
training than previously calculated. Costs per job would be higher by a factor of 5.0 / 3.7, or by 
about 35 percent. Customized job training in the above discussion was estimated to have a cost 
per job created of between $800 per job-year and $2,000 per job-year. A 35 percent increase 
would bring these costs up to between $1,080 and $2,700 per job-year. This is still probably less 
than half of even lower-bound estimates of the benefits per job-year. Financing costs might 
slightly raise these costs per job-year, depending upon the type of financing.  
Manufacturing extension   
The manufacturing extension variable is measured as the logarithmic percentage change 
in total jobs that would be predicted from just adding in the jobs claimed to be created or retained 
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because of manufacturing extension, based on surveys of extension clients. If manufacturing’s 
multiplier effect is 2, then we would predict the coefficient on this variable to be 2.  
The actual estimated coefficient is 0.86 and is highly statistically significant, with a t-
statistic of over 3.5. If the manufacturing multiplier effect is 2, the coefficient estimate implies 
that 43 percent of the jobs claimed in client surveys to be created by manufacturing extension are 
actually due to manufacturing extension.  
As mentioned in a previous section, the results from Ehlen (2001), based on previous 
surveys of manufacturing extension clients, implies a cost per job-year created by manufacturing 
extension of around $950. But Ehlen’s estimates assume that 100 percent of the client-survey-
claimed jobs are due to manufacturing extension. If only 43 percent of client-claimed jobs are 
actually due to manufacturing extension, the cost per job-year created increases by a factor of 1 / 
0.43 to about $2,200 per job-year. This would still be relatively cheap compared to likely local 
benefits of a job-year, even with offsets added in from plausible financing mechanisms.   
College graduate proportion  
The college graduate proportion variable has a point estimate of 0.37, which is highly 
statistically significantly different from zero (t-statistic of about 3). The estimated effect of 
college graduation percentage on growth in these manufacturing intensive commuting zones is 
roughly consistent with previous research. For example, Glaeser and Saiz (2004) find a 10-year 
elasticity of MSA population growth with respect to the college graduation percentage that 
ranges from 0.41 to 0.58 in the various specifications.  
Is this coefficient of 0.37 “large”? Does it imply that increasing the local college 
graduation percentage is a cost-effective way of increasing local job growth? A useful way of 
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gauging the size of this college graduation effect on local job growth is to translate this effect 
into a job-creation effect per college graduate.  In this sample of 105 commuting zones, the 
average number of 25 to 64-year-olds is 311,503. One more college graduate would increase the 
college graduation percentage by 0.000321 percent. The coefficient of 0.37 implies this would 
increase the ln of 2015 commuting zone employment by 0.000119 percent. In these 105 
commuting zones, average 2015 private employment was 226,384. This implies that each 
additional college graduate in 2007 increases 2015 jobs by 0.27 jobs. If we assume this eight-
year change is an adjustment of only 47 percent of the full long-run adjustment to a higher 
employment level, the long-run increase in jobs per additional college graduate would be 0.57.  
But what is the social cost of public policy inducing one more college graduate? Is it low 
enough that this social cost is significantly less than the estimated benefits per job-year of $5,000 
to $20,000? 
From looking at the research literature on education policy initiatives that increase 
educational attainment, the answer seems to be this: the financial cost of inducing one more 
college graduate may be high, but the true social cost is likely to be negative—that is, inducing 
one more college graduate has social benefits even before considering local job-growth effects. If 
there are social benefits from one more college graduate, ignoring local job-growth effects, then 
any such local job growth effects are just icing on the cake.  
For example, in a recent benefit-cost analysis of the Kalamazoo Promise scholarship 
program (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2016), the financial cost of the program was 
roughly $18,000 per participant. The program induced an additional bachelor’s degree from 
about 10 percentage points of participants. Therefore, the cost per college graduate was about 
$180,000. At a discount rate of 3 percent, this is equivalent to an ongoing annual cost of $5,400. 
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If each college graduate induces 0.57 jobs, the annual cost per job induced would be about 
$9,500. This is roughly in the range of social benefits of job creation of $5,000 to $20,000.  
But a full benefit-cost analysis of the Kalamazoo Promise suggests the program has net 
benefits, not costs, ignoring job-growth effects. The present value of earnings increases for 
participants is 4.66 times the costs of the scholarships. Furthermore, from a full benefit-cost 
perspective, most of the scholarship dollars have offsetting transfer benefits for recipients (e.g., 
reducing student debts), and hence are not true social costs.71  
A Closer Look at Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley 
 As mentioned above, among larger manufacturing-intensive communities, Grand Rapids 
and the Lehigh Valley stand out. These two communities seem to have manufacturing sectors 
that have been unusually resilient and have shown some good growth trends in the last 10 years. 
 What does case study evidence on Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley show? 
Fortuitously (or perhaps not so much, as success attracts attention), both Grand Rapids and the 
Lehigh Valley have been subject to relatively recent in-depth case study analyses. The discussion 
below is largely based on Atkins et al. (2011) and Safford (2009). The former is a Brookings 
Institution case study comparison of eight manufacturing-intensive areas. The Brookings case 
                                                 
71 How do the benefits from the job creation effects of one more local college graduate compare with the 
total economic benefits of one more local college graduate?  As mentioned above, Bartik (2018) finds that one more 
local job has annual benefits equivalent to about $12,000.  If one more college graduate increases local jobs by 0.57, 
then the annual benefits attributable to job-creation benefits from one more college graduate are around $7,000 (= 
$12,000 × 0.57).  Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2016) find that a college graduate, compared to a high school 
graduate, has career earnings higher by about $840,000, in 2015 dollars.  At a 3 percent social discount rate, this is 
equivalent to annual earnings being higher by $25,000.  With an education spillover of 86 percent, as implied by the 
research of  Moretti (2004), the total local earnings benefits of one more local college graduate will be about 
$47,000 annually.  The job-creation benefits of $7,000 are about 15 percent of this overall local earnings total.  
Therefore, most of the benefits from more college graduates are due to higher-quality local jobs, not simply a higher 
quantity of local jobs.  This is consistent with the earlier discussion of the research literature on K–12 spending, 
which concluded that most local benefits take place through higher job quality, not a higher job quantity. 
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study singled out Grand Rapids as the only one of the eight areas that had experienced much 
recent manufacturing growth. The latter is a book-length discussion of why the Allentown–
Lehigh Valley area was able to respond much better to the steel industry’s collapse in the late 
1970s and early 1980s than the seemingly similar Youngstown, Ohio, area responded.  
 From these case studies of these two areas, what are some common themes? 
 1. Both Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley were already doing better than other 
manufacturing-intensive areas well before the big collapse of U.S. manufacturing after 2000.  As 
the Brookings study of Grand Rapids shows, despite the post-2000 problems, Grand Rapids had 
a net gain in manufacturing employment of 28 percent from 1980 to 2005 (Atkins et al. [2011], 
Table 1). This performance was far better than the other seven communities considered in the 
Brookings study. Safford (2009) documents that from 1983 to 2000, compared to Youngstown, 
Allentown was more successful in diversifying its manufacturing away from steel and other 
declining industries into more “knowledge-based” manufacturing industries such as electronics, 
instruments, and chemicals, and that as a result, average earnings per worker grew far faster in 
the Allentown/Lehigh Valley area than in Youngstown from 1983 to 2000.  
What this suggests is that the success of manufacturing-intensive areas such as Grand 
Rapids and the Lehigh Valley is due to long-term area characteristics and perhaps long-term 
policies. Success in economic development is not achieved overnight, but rather requires long-
term commitments to policies that work. 
2. Despite these two areas’ success prior to 2000 and after 2007, both areas suffered 
significant problems in the 2000-to-2007 period.  This has already been documented above, in 
our presentation of the shift-share analyses of the two economies. When the national economic 
headwinds facing manufacturing were extremely severe, in the 2000 to 2007 period, almost no 
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 95 
manufacturing-intensive areas were able to show much success, at least with their manufacturing 
sector. Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley were no exception. But when the national picture on 
manufacturing changed from “disastrous” in 2000–2007 to “mediocre” in 2007–2015, the 
underlying competitive strengths of Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley were once again 
revealed.  
3. Both Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley area have invested heavily in cluster strategies 
that seek to provide business services, land, human capital, and financing to groups of 
interrelated firms.  
The Brookings study highlights the economic development efforts of The Right Place, 
the lead economic development organization in the Grand Rapids area. A huge part of this 
organization’s economic development efforts involved emphasis on clusters of related industries. 
According to Brookings, “As part of [the Right Place’s] retention efforts, it convened industry 
cluster groups for information exchange, gave financial and strategic advice to stabilize privately 
held family firms facing intergenerational transitions, and provided and coordinated assistance to 
small and medium-sized manufacturers.” (Atkins et al. [2011], p. 14) The latter included The 
Right Place staffing a co-located Grand Rapids–area branch office of the Michigan 
Manufacturing Technology Center, the Michigan affiliate of the national Manufacturing 
Extension Partnership. As Brookings mentions, these clusters, which focused on both retention 
and expansion issues, were formed “for more than a dozen industry groups,” each of which were 
“supported by a Right Place staff member” and were focused on specific issues, frequently 
meeting for a year or two to deal with some issue before disbanding (p. 14).  
The Right Place program today continues to highlight specific manufacturing clusters. 
The particular industries identified in The Right Place’s most recent report on manufacturing in 
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west Michigan are office furniture, automotive, medical devices, food processing, aerospace, and 
defense (The Right Place 2018).  
The Safford (2009) study highlights the Lehigh Valley’s successful effort to attract one of 
Pennsylvania’s four regional centers for the Ben Franklin Technology Partnership, whose “idea 
was to create public-private partnerships that would build on the state’s higher education 
infrastructure to support existing companies seeking to engage older technologies as well as to 
generate new ones. . . . The Ben Franklin program’s creators planned on establishing three 
centers, one in Philadelphia, another in Pittsburgh, and a third covering the rest of the state to be 
located . . . near Penn State. The local group in Allentown . . . succeeded in advocating for a 
fourth, located near Lehigh University” (p. 74). 
According to Safford (2009), “The Ben Franklin Partnership has played a pivotal role in 
developing the region’s entrepreneurial infrastructure” (p. 119).  This includes funding to set up 
a business incubator and support for a local venture capital fund, as well as various programs at 
Lehigh University attempting to assist local businesses.  
The Lehigh Valley’s lead economic development organization, the Lehigh Valley 
Economic Development Corporation, continues to focus on various clusters of related industries. 
Its website and strategic plan specifically identify a focus on four areas: 1) high-performance 
manufacturing, 2) life sciences research and manufacturing, 3) high-value business services, and 
4) food and beverage processing.  
4. Both areas strategically emphasized overcoming industry barriers to growth by supplying 
additional land and labor resources.  
The Brookings report on Grand Rapids particularly highlights the area’s focus on 
developing life sciences–related jobs. “The cornerstone of this [life sciences] expansion was the 
What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies? 
  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 97 
development of the Medical Mile, an approximate mile of medical-related development [in 
Grand Rapids]. . . . The complex was jump started . . . with the . . . Van Andel Research Institute, 
a biomedical research center that opened in 2000. . . . A second major development was the 
[2008–2010] relocation of Michigan State University’s [medical school] to Grand Rapids.”  
These land and research and educational investments were combined with the creation of 
a cluster effort, the West Michigan Medical Device Consortium. “[This] Consortium was formed 
to give medical device companies throughout the region the opportunity to collaborate, and to 
promote their specialized expertise in the medical device industry. An automotive parts firm . . . 
moved into the medical devices market, making [orthopedic] parts. A bakery and wrappings 
supplier established a medical packaging subsidiary, manufacturing packaging for medical test 
kits. . . .”  
Safford’s (2009) case study of the Lehigh Valley mentions the region’s foresight in 1959 
in creating an industrial park: “The action [in the 1950s] with a more lasting impact was the 
creation of the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park, then a new concept in economic development” (p. 
72). According to a recent economic development strategy report for the Lehigh Valley (Garner 
Economics 2014), “The seven parks within the LVIP system are home to more than 470 
businesses employing more than 22,000 people” (p. 3). 
The annual report of the Lehigh Valley Economic Development Corporation (LVEDC 
2016) highlights the area’s efforts to deal with a variety of specific barriers to growth. These 
include the following:  
 The Lehigh Valley Lending Network, a consortium of 17 area banks and the LVEDC, under 
which a business can make a single application for available public and private financing 
options;  
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 The LVEDC Education and Talent Supply Council, which is trying to better connect area 
schools and colleges with the skill needs of area firms; 
 The Lehigh Valley Land Recycling Initiative, which is engaged in 21 projects to redevelop 
brownfields. 
5. Both Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley’s economic development efforts rested on the 
well-coordinated political and financial support provided by a local business community that 
was interested in promoting local economic development. 
One of the main points of Safford’s fascinating book is that such unified local business 
investment in local economic development, on a sustained basis, is not always available. It was 
not available in Youngstown. And, with many banks and other corporations consolidating into 
national or international operations, local business leadership and investment often can be hard to 
find for midsized communities.  
According to Safford (2009), in the Allentown/Lehigh Valley area, compared to 
Youngstown, “the personal involvement of top leaders of key businesses . . . [has] proved vital to 
regional success” (p. 8).  He points to area business leaders helping fund the Lehigh Valley 
Industrial Park in the 1950s.  Local business and political leaders in the area successfully lobbied 
the state of Pennsylvania to attract an extra and unplanned fourth Ben Franklin Technology 
Center to be located in the Lehigh Valley. This extra center also involved a private venture 
capital fund, which “drew investments from several of the community’s companies and several 
wealthy individuals” (p. 75).  The Lehigh Valley Economic Development Corporation is in part 
funded through an area hotel tax.  
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The Brookings study highlights the involvement in the development of Grand Rapids of 
several influential persons or entities:  the founders of Amway, the descendants of the founders 
of the Steelcase office furniture company, the founder of Universal Forest Products, and the 
Meijer Foundation (endowed by the founders of a grocery store chain). Both the Brookings study 
and a study by Miller-Adams et al. (2017) highlight that these community investments were 
coordinated in a variety of ways—frequently through the Grand Action Committee, whose 
ostensible main purpose was supporting the development of downtown Grand Rapids. Private 
individuals and firms funded the Right Place Program in the 1980s within the local Chamber of 
Commerce, before it was made independent of the Chamber in 1997. The development of the 
downtown Grand Rapids campus of Grand Valley State University in the 1990s was largely 
funded through major private donors. The Van Andel Research Institute was funded by one of 
the cofounders of the Amway Corporation. The MSU medical school relocation was largely 
achieved through large-scale Grand Rapids–area donations: “It’s called money, it’s how we got 
the school here,” one observer said (Atkins et al., p. 16).  
 Do these case studies show that the manufacturing success of Grand Rapids and the 
Lehigh Valley is due to investments in creating clusters, and in overcoming key barriers to these 
clusters’ growth? No. Almost any local community today talking about economic development 
will talk about clusters. Almost any local economic development organization will have some 
efforts to deal with issues of labor skills, suitable land for development, and financing 
availability. Grand Rapids and the Lehigh Valley cannot be called unique for having such 
programs.  
 However, from perusing these case studies, one gets the sense that the Grand Rapids and 
Lehigh Valley areas’ efforts to grow their economy, by strategies focused on overcoming key 
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barriers to cluster growth, have been funded on a larger scale, have been more sustained over 
time, and have been of higher quality.  This may in part be because of the interest in local 
economic development of these two areas’ local leaders, and in particular these areas’ local 
business leaders.  
CONCLUSION 
 Let’s return to the main question addressed in this report: What works to help 
manufacturing-intensive local economies? 
 If national policy arranges things so that overall U.S. manufacturing performance is as 
bad as it was from 2000 to 2007, the answer is: Nothing works, except for the local area doing 
whatever it can to rapidly abandon manufacturing and move into other industries. And even that 
will not work very well for most manufacturing-intensive local communities. No local policy for 
manufacturing-intensive communities can totally escape the headwinds of disastrous national 
manufacturing performance.  
 But if national policy allows for overall U.S. manufacturing performance to be at least 
mediocre, then state and local public policy can do a lot to improve the performance of 
manufacturing-intensive communities. State and local policymakers can do so by investing in 
services that help local manufacturing.   
 The easy fix of handing out cash to manufacturers via tax incentives is not the strategy to 
emphasize. What is more cost-effective in revitalizing manufacturing-intensive local economies 
is investing in customized business services, human capital development, infrastructure 
development, brownfield development, and neighborhood development.  
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 Specifically, the following state and local public policy approaches are recommended: 
 Cut back on business tax incentives by providing business tax incentives only to 
manufacturing companies with high multipliers. This could involve cutting the economic 
development budget for tax incentives by over half in many states.  
 Invest economic development budgets more in manufacturing extension services, customized 
job training, and other customized business services to small and medium-sized businesses, 
with an emphasis on locally owned businesses. Because there is a natural limit to the need for 
such services, an efficient scale of such customized services probably would still involve a 
lower overall budget for economic development than is currently the case. But the resulting 
job creation effects for local manufacturing would be greater than for current economic 
development, which wastes a great deal of resources on relatively inefficient long-term 
business tax incentives with low multipliers.  
 Invest more funds in human-capital development programs:  high-quality child care; high-
quality preschool; increased K–12 funding, particularly for lower-income children; and high-
quality job training that is demand oriented toward the actual skills needed by growing 
employers, in places or times where unemployment is high, in programs that provide job 
training combined with wage subsidies for hiring the long-term unemployed for newly 
created jobs. 
 Invest in developing more high-quality land for job creation through infrastructure 
investments in transportation, brownfield cleanup and redevelopment, neighborhood 
development that improves infrastructure and services in distressed neighborhoods, and 
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changes in zoning and building codes that allow more business development and housing 
development.  
Cutting back on business tax incentives, and instead investing in an array of public 
services to promote economic development, may be more cost-effective, but it is a harder 
strategy to sell politically. Providing expensive business tax incentives for a large new facility of 
a large corporation has a huge short-term political payoff for governors and mayors. The 
favorable media coverage from attracting a Foxconn manufacturing plant to your state is 
immediately attractive to political leaders. In contrast, providing public services tends to have 
longer-term and less obvious benefits for local economic development.  
In addition, handing out cash to businesses is easy, and it wins influential friends. 
Providing public services to promote business development, job skills development, or land 
development is a more complex strategy that is more challenging to consistently carry out in a 
high-quality manner. The immediate direct beneficiaries of such services are more diffuse and 
less politically influential.    
What local areas need are local news media and local interest groups and leaders—
especially locally interested business leaders—that are consistently committed to what will best 
work to promote long-term local economic development. These local groups can push to invest 
local dollars in long-term development strategies, and to consistently push to evaluate and 
improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of what the local area does to promote development.  
 The national interest is served by local economic development strategies that invest in 
business productivity, not in tax incentives to relocate businesses. What can national 
policymakers do to help promote local economic development strategies which will invest in the 
productivity of manufacturing-intensive communities? Some ideas include the following: 
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 Aggregate national economic development policies should regard promoting an overall 
competitive U.S. manufacturing sector as a goal. This requires attention to how 
macroeconomic policies and other policies affect exchange rates, and how trade policies 
affect manufacturing.  
 The federal government should be willing to be a partner in helping provide matching funds 
for some of these public services that help promote local economic development. These 
include federal support for manufacturing extension services, customized job training, human 
capital programs from birth to adulthood, infrastructure, brownfield development, and 
neighborhood development.  
 Federal support is particularly needed for evaluation of local economic development 
programs, and in particular customized business services. Local communities around the 
nation can benefit from learning which particular program designs lead to the best results.  
 U.S. antitrust policy may have hidden effects on local economic development by the effect it 
has on the vitality of local business leadership. National policies that discourage corporate 
consolidation and encourage more business competition may indirectly help local economic 
development by making sure there is a more extensive presence in local communities of 
banks and other local companies that are locally owned.  
What perhaps most discourages creative public policy toward manufacturing-intensive 
communities is the belief that nothing can be done. A common belief is that U.S. manufacturing 
is going down the tubes because of world competition and robots. According to this belief, 
nothing that manufacturing-intensive communities do to respond will much matter.  
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This need not be the case. It seems unlikely that with even minimally wise national 
policies, U.S. manufacturing long-term will do as poorly as it did from 2000 to 2007. Some 
researchers even believe that rising demand for customized products, and other economic forces, 
will lead to a growing interest of manufacturers in locating their production closer to major 
markets such as the United States (Livesey 2017).  
But part of a brighter future for manufacturing-intensive communities also lies in these 
communities’ own hands. Can these local communities find the local leadership and resources to 
invest in the public services needed to promote local economic development? With the right 
leadership and investments, manufacturing-intensive communities can promote more and better-
quality jobs, both for their communities and for the overall U.S. economy.  
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DATA APPENDIX FOR REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
(Tables 16 and 17) 
 
 
The college proportion, price, and real-wage variables used in the regression with the 105 
manufacturing-intensive commuting zones (see Tables 16 and 17) are derived from the American 
Community Survey. Each individual observation in ACS is probabilistically assigned to a 
commuting zone by using the proportion of each Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) population 
that is in that commuting zone. That population weight and the individual observation’s housing 
weight or individual weight are used in weighting all data.   
Local prices are derived from relative prices for one- and two-bedroom apartments in 
each commuting zone. This is similar to procedures used in previous studies by McHenry and 
McInerney (2014) and Moretti (2013).  Relative overall local prices are assumed to be 50 percent 
of local housing prices; this is based on regression evidence of a relationship between overall 
local prices and local housing prices in Aten (2006).  
For wage rate calculations, all observations are dropped that are allocated in ACS on any 
relevant variable (e.g., age, sex, education, weeks worked, self-employment income, wage and 
salary income, or usual hours worked). Observations are also dropped if self-employment 
income is nonzero, as respondent reports of weeks worked and work hours could include self-
employment.   
Wage rates are calculated as wage and salary earnings divided by annual hours worked.  
Annual hours worked are derived by multiplying usual hours worked per week by weeks 
worked.  Weeks worked are derived as the midpoint of the weeks-worked interval reported in 
ACS.  Individual observations are dropped if the number of weeks worked is less than 14 or the 
usual hours worked are fewer than 11.  The dropping of usual hours worked if they are fewer 
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than 11 is based on measurement error due to respondents misinterpreting the question as being 
asked about usual hours worked in a day rather than a week, as documented by Baum-Snow and 
Neal (2009).  The midpoint assignment of weeks worked is similar to procedures used by Perry, 
Thomason, and Bernhardt (2016), who also provide evidence that this method yields similar 
results to using continuous weeks worked, except for the first interval, weeks worked less than 
14, which is dropped in this analysis.   
We then calculate mean ln real wage for each commuting zone for groups differentiated 
by gender/age/education.  The age groups used are ages 25 to 34, 34 to 44, 45 to 54, and 55 to 
64; older and younger individuals are dropped—the older because they are less likely to be in the 
labor force, the younger because of issues with education classification.  The initial education 
categories attempted were fivefold: 1) high school dropout, 2) high school graduate, 3) associate 
degree, 4) bachelor’s degree, and 5) some higher degree.  Because of missing observations in 
some categories in some commuting zones, some of the gender/age/education categories were 
combined.  To reduce the influence of outliers, real-wage-rate observations were bottom coded at 
the first percentile of the overall wage distribution.   
The average ln(real wage) for each age/gender/education category is then calculated 
using the person weights from the ACS, combined with a weight reflecting the probability that 
this PUMA is in that commuting zone.  The real-wage variable is then calculated as average ln 
real wages across these categories, with the proportion of U.S. population in 2007 in each 
category used as weights.   
Three measures—1) the business tax/value added, 2) tax incentives/value added, and 3) 
customized job training/value added—are averages from 2007 to 2015 from the Upjohn 
Institute’s Panel Data on Incentives and Taxes (Bartik 2017a).  The calculated numbers are for 
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the city if available, for the state if that city is not available, and is set to 0 if missing. An 
indicator for “missing” is included in the regression.  
The share-effect prediction is derived from the Upjohn Institute’s WholeData version of 
County Business Patterns and is based on data aggregated to three-digit NAICS codes. Share-
effect-predicted additional jobs from 2007 to 2015 are calculated and added to 2007 jobs and are 
used to generate predicted growth in logarithm of private jobs.   
MEP jobs created are based on data provided by MEP based on client surveys. These are 
what the client claims to be jobs created or retained due to MEP services. The claimed job 
creation/retention is aggregated to commuting-zone level for all years from 2007 to 2015. The 
predicted job growth is the predicted change in ln(private jobs) from adding this job growth to 
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